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AFIT/GA/ENG/08-01 
 
Abstract 
 
 
The U.S. military’s increasing reliance on commercial and military 
communications satellites to enable widely-dispersed, mobile forces to communicate 
makes these space assets increasingly vulnerable to attack by adversaries.  Attacks on 
these satellites could cause military communications to become unavailable at critical 
moments during a conflict.  This research dissected a typical satellite communications 
system in order to provide an understanding of the possible attacker entry points into the 
system, to determine the vulnerabilities associated with each of these access points, and 
to analyze the possible impacts of these vulnerabilities to U.S. military operations.  By 
understanding these vulnerabilities of U.S. communications satellite systems, methods 
can be developed to mitigate these threats and protect future systems.   
This research concluded that the satellite antenna is the most vulnerable 
component of the satellite communications system’s space segment.  The antenna makes 
the satellite vulnerable to intentional attacks such as:  RF jamming, spoofing, meaconing, 
and deliberate physical attack.  The most vulnerable Earth segment component was found 
to be the Earth station network, which incorporates both Earth station and NOC 
vulnerabilities.  Earth segment vulnerabilities include RF jamming, deliberate physical 
attack, and Internet connection vulnerabilities.  The most vulnerable user segment 
components were found to be the SSPs and PoPs.  SSPs are subject to the vulnerabilities 
of the services offered, the vulnerabilities of Internet connectivity, and the vulnerabilities 
 v
associated with operating the VSAT central hub.  PoPs are susceptible to the 
vulnerabilities of the PoP routers, the vulnerabilities of Internet and Intranet connectivity, 
and the vulnerabilities associated with cellular network access. 
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A SURVEY OF SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM  
VULNERABILITIES  
 
 
I: Introduction 
 
 
 
The use of satellite communications, both commercial and military, has been 
increasing steadily over the past several years, both in the U.S. and in other countries.  
Additionally, since satellite communications technology advances have allowed these 
satellites to decrease in size while maintaining capabilities, the cost of launching and 
using communications satellites has decreased.  Many of these satellites utilize 
commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) components, enabling further cost reductions.  These 
cost decreases have enabled other (less advanced) countries to obtain space assets, 
including those that could serve as anti-satellite payloads.  Many countries, if not 
purchasing their own satellites, are leasing transponders on-board commercial 
communications satellites, such as the INTELSAT satellites [4].   
Satellite communications are the “backbone” of net-centric warfare.  They are 
important for sending information to widely-dispersed, mobile forces.  There are not 
enough military-dedicated satellites on-orbit to provide the bandwidth required to 
transmit these volumes of information.  Therefore, the U.S. military relies on both 
military and commercial satellites to provide these communications.  This reliance on 
commercial space systems for military operations makes these assets vulnerable to 
attacks by adversaries.  As Robert Ackerman’s article entitled Space Vulnerabilities 
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Threaten U.S. Edge in Battle states, “the disruption, denial, degradation, or destruction of 
space systems or services could seriously affect U.S. war fighting capabilities” [4].  As of 
April 2006, the percentage of communications being provided by commercial 
communications satellites for Operation Iraqi Freedom was an astounding eighty-four 
percent, according to Hank Rausch’s Jamming Commercial Satellite Communications 
during Wartime: an Empirical Study.  Much of these commercial satellite 
communications were being supplied via leased transponders on-board INTELSAT and 
EUTELSAT satellites.  Unfortunately, these commercial communications satellites are 
not built with the capabilities to protect themselves from potential attacks, such as 
jamming [130].  Such attacks could cause military communications to become 
unavailable at critical moments during a conflict.      
The criticality of satellite communications to U.S. military operations makes the 
understanding of the vulnerabilities in satellite communications systems highly important 
in order to be able to thwart possible future attacks of these systems.  This research aims 
to dissect typical satellite communications systems (which include a space segment, an 
Earth segment, and a user segment) to:  1) provide a better understanding of possible 
attacker entry points into the systems, 2) provide a better understanding of satellite 
communications systems vulnerabilities, and 3) examine the possible impacts of these 
vulnerabilities to U.S. military operations.   
The remainder of this document is divided into four chapters.  Chapter two 
contains background information on communications satellite systems, particularly the 
INTELSAT system.  It includes information on the INTELSAT space segment (i.e. the 
satellites), the INTELSAT Earth segment including both INTELSAT standard Earth 
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stations and very small aperture terminals (VSATs), and multiple access schemes utilized 
in communications satellite systems.  This information all ties into the determination of 
all the possible entry points into a communications satellite system that is presented in the 
third chapter.  In addition, a discussion of some emerging and proposed satellite systems 
is presented in order that any new access points and vulnerabilities that arise due to these 
systems may be analyzed.  Finally, several examples of attacks on communications 
satellite systems that have taken place in the past are provided as evidence that these 
types of attacks are possible and that the threat of attacks on U.S. space assets is real.   
Chapter three presents a breakdown for each segment of a communications 
satellite system, down to the component-level.  From this level it is possible to identify 
the possible access points in each segment that may allow an attacker access to the 
communications satellite system.  Once all of the access points are determined, it is then 
possible to analyze each access point and determine the vulnerabilities that each poses to 
the overall communications satellite system architecture.  The results of this analysis are 
presented in the fourth chapter.   
In addition to the vulnerabilities of each access point, chapter four also discusses 
which access point is most vulnerable within each satellite communications system 
segment.  An example of the impact these vulnerabilities can have on a particular satellite 
system, namely INTELSAT 14 which is the satellite planned to carry the Internet routing 
in space (IRIS) payload, is also presented in this chapter.   
Chapter five provides a summary of research findings.  Also, some ideas for 
future work in this area are presented
 4
 II:  Background  
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
 
The U.S. continues to dominate the military space arena, as it has since the end of 
the Cold War, owning over half of all the military satellites currently in orbit.  In the 
recent past, the U.S. military has come to rely more heavily on commercial space systems 
to provide communications.  In fact, during the Gulf War, INTELSAT provided the 
majority of long haul communications.  The 2001 Report of the Commission to Assess 
United States National Security Space Management and Organization cautioned that the 
U.S. may be making itself vulnerable to a “space Pearl Harbor” because of its strong 
dependence on space systems.  The report recommended that the U.S. develop ways to 
protect its space assets [146]. 
Earth stations and communications links are the most vulnerable space systems 
elements and may be susceptible to attack by any of the following means: conventional 
military means, computer hacking, and electronic jamming.  Several mitigation methods, 
such as shielding, directional antennas, and burst transmissions, can help to protect the 
communications links.  However, these methods cannot completely protect the links, 
leaving them still vulnerable to some attacks.  The Earth stations, on the other hand, are 
susceptible to physical attacks which could potentially wipe out communications across 
the space system, especially since most commercial space systems have only one network 
operations center (NOC) and one Earth station.  For this reason, countries may need to 
protect their satellite Earth stations by means of basic military force [146]. 
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2.2 History of INTELSAT and INTELSAT Satellite Capacity 
 
 
In August 1964, the international organization INTELSAT was created to produce, 
own, and operate a global communications satellite system.  INTELSAT was a treaty-
based organization made up of nearly 150 member nations.  In 2000, the member nations 
agreed to INTELSAT becoming a private company, forming INTELSAT Ltd.  
INTELSAT Ltd is based in Bermuda [45, 150].  Today, INTELSAT is the world’s 
leading provider of GEO satellite services, owning and operating more than fifty 
communications satellites (COMSATs) [51].  INTELSAT satellites offer a variety of 
services, including: telephony, data transfer, fax, television (TV) broadcasting, and 
teleconferencing.  INTELSAT offers a wide range of Earth terminals that can be used to 
access its satellites.  These terminals range from 0.5 meters (m) to 30 m and can be 
operated in both the C- and Ku- bands.  Note that C-band operating frequencies are 
nominally 6 gigahertz (GHz) for the uplink and 4 GHz for the downlink, and in the Ku-
band, operating frequencies are typically 14 GHz for the uplink and 11 to 12 GHz for the 
downlink [45].   
INTELSAT’s first COMSAT, INTELSAT I (also known as Early Bird), was 
launched on April 6, 1965.  INTELSAT I was the first commercial COMSAT and it was 
used to provide telecommunications services between the United States and Europe. 
INTELSAT I carried 240 two-way voice circuits or one TV channel.  Only two earth 
stations (one in the U.S. and one in Europe) could access INTELSAT I at any one time, 
creating only one point-to-point trunk [8, 143].  INTELSAT launched its second series of 
satellites, the INTELSAT II satellites, in 1967.   The INTELSAT II satellites offered 
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coverage of the Atlantic and Pacific regions [83].  Like INTELSAT I, the INTELSAT II 
satellites also carried 240 two-way voice circuits [108].   In contrast to the INTELSAT I 
satellite, the INTELSAT II satellites could provide TV and phone services 
simultaneously [8].  On the INTELSAT III series satellites, launched between 1968 and 
1970, there was a significant increase in capacity per satellite over the INTELSAT I and 
INTELSAT II satellites.  Each INTELSAT III satellite carried 1200 to 1500 two-way 
voice circuits or four TV channels [83, 108].  INTELSAT began launching its 
INTELSAT IV series satellites in 1971.  The INTELSAT IV series satellites carried 
between 3,000 and 9,000 two-way voice circuits or twelve TV channels (that is, one color 
TV channel per repeater) [83, 108].  Due to demands for more capacity, in 1975 
INTELSAT began launching its INTELSAT IV-A series satellites.  The nominal 
INTELSAT IV-A capacity was 6,000 two-way voice circuits plus two TV channels, with 
their capacity capable of reaching a maximum of 15,000 two-way voice circuits.  The 
INTELSAT V satellites, launched from 1980 to 1984, had a nominal capacity of 12,000 
two-way voice circuits plus two TV channels.  An additional maritime communications 
subsystem was incorporated into INTELSAT 505, 506, 507, 508, and 509.  The maritime 
communications subsystem consisted of thirty voice circuits for high-power mode and 
fifteen voice circuits for low-power mode.   To maintain the necessary amount of 
capacity in the Atlantic region, INTELSAT modified the INTELSAT V satellites, 
creating the INTELSAT V-A series.  The INTELSAT V-A series was launched from 
1985 to 1989 and each satellite in the series has a capacity of 15,000 two-way voice 
circuits plus two TV channels.  The INTELSAT VI series satellites, launched from 1989 
to 1991, each has a nominal capacity of 24,000 two-way voice circuits plus three TV 
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channels, while the INTELSAT VII series satellites carry a nominal capacity of 18,000 
two-way voice circuits plus three TV channels [108]. The INTELSAT VI 
communications payload included a static and dynamic switching network. The static 
network allowed transponder interconnections, while the dynamic network made possible 
satellite switched time division multiple access (SS/TDMA). SS/TDMA will be discussed 
further in the section on multiple access schemes [8]. The INTELSAT VII satellites, 
which replaced the INTELSAT V and INTELSAT V-A satellites in the Pacific region, 
were launched between 1993 and 1996.  The INTELSAT VII series satellites are smaller 
than the INTELSAT VI series satellites, a change from the current trend of increased size 
and capacity with each additional satellite series.  The INTELSAT VII series satellites are 
smaller due to a requirement for more flexibility, which was accomplished by the use of 
many switches to interconnect INTELSAT VII’s increased number of antenna beams.   
INTELSAT VII-A satellites, a “growth version” of INTELSAT VII, have nominal 
capacities of 22,500 two-way voice circuits and three TV channels.  The INTELSAT VIII 
series satellites, which began launching in 1997, also have a capacity of 22,500 two-way 
voice circuits and three TV channels [108]. The INTELSAT VIII-A satellites, 
INTELSAT 805 and 806 which were launched in 1998, have approximately the same 
capacity as the INTELSAT VIII series satellites [108, 150]. The difference between the 
INTELSAT VIII and INTELSAT VIII-A series satellites is a major restructuring of the 
communications payload.  The INTELSAT IX series satellites, launched from 2001 to 
2003, were intended to replace the INTELSAT VI satellites [108]. The INTELSAT IX 
satellites each carry approximately 600,000 two-way voice circuits or 600 TV channels, a 
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dramatic increase over the early series INTELSATs [83].   A summary of the evolution of 
INTELSAT capacity for Series I through Series IX can be seen in Table 1 below.   
Table 1.  Evolution of INTELSAT Satellite Capacity (INTELSATs I-IX) [8, 83, 108, 143] 
Satellite Capacity 
INTELSAT I 240 two-way voice circuits or 1 TV channel 
INTELSAT II 240 two-way voice circuits or 1 TV channel 
INTELSAT III 1200-1500 two-way voice circuits or 4 TV channels 
INTELSAT IV 3000-9000 two-way voice circuits or 12 TV channels 
INTELSAT IV-A 
6000 two way-voice circuits plus 2 TV channels or 15,000 two-way voice 
circuits 
INTELSAT V 
12,000 two-way voice circuits plus 2 TV channels and 15 (low power 
mode) or 30 (high power mode) two-way voice circuits for maritime 
communications subsystem 
INTELSAT V-A 15,000 two-way voice circuits plus 2 TV channels 
INTELSAT VI 24,000 two-way voice circuits plus 3 TV channels 
INTELSAT VII 18,000 two-way voice circuits plus 3 TV channels 
INTELSAT VII-A 22,500 two-way voice circuits plus 3 TV channels 
INTELSAT VIII 22,500 two-way voice circuits plus 3 TV channels 
INTELSAT VIII-A 22,500 two-way voice circuits plus 3 TV channels 
INTELSAT IX 600,000 two-way voice circuits or 600 TV channels 
 
In 2004 INTELSAT continued with its trend of launching large, high capacity 
satellites with the launch of INTELSAT 10-02.  INTELSAT 10-02 is the replacement for 
an INTELSAT VII series satellite, INTELSAT 707.  INTELSAT 10-02 carries up to 70 
C-band and 36 Ku-band 36-megahertz (MHz) equivalent transponder units.  This 
capacity compares to the INTELSAT IX series satellites with INTELSAT 907 carrying 
76 C-band and 22 Ku-band 36-MHz equivalent transponder units [90]. 
INTELSAT launched another satellite, INTELSAT 11, in late 2007.  INTELSAT 
11 is intended to replace INTELSAT 6B and INTELSAT 3R, which were formerly 
named PAS-6B and PAS-3R and were owned by PanAmSat.  PanAmSat and its satellites 
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were acquired by INTELSAT in 2006.  INTELSAT 11 has a communications payload 
which consists of 25 C-band and 18 Ku-band transponders [90].  
 
2.3 Satellite Access Points 
 
 
INTELSAT standard Earth stations (Standards A, B, C, D (no longer in use), E, F, 
G, H, and K) provide access to the INTELSAT satellites.  Access to the satellites requires 
a choice of modulation and multiple access techniques. In addition, cross-strapping 
allows interconnections between C-band and Ku-band earth stations.  This is possible 
starting with the INTELSAT V series satellites [2, 9, 108].  
 
2.3.1 INTELSAT Standard A 
The INTELSAT Standard A terminal operates in the C-band and it has been used 
for all INTELSAT series satellites (I to IX).  A smaller Standard A antenna size, which 
can be used with INTELSAT satellite series beginning with INTELSAT V, was 
introduced in 1986.  Antennas sizes were reduced from 29-32 m to 15-18 m.  The smaller 
antenna size caused the Standard A gain requirements to be reduced.  The modulation 
and multiple access formats that are compatible with Standard A terminals include:  
frequency division multiplexing/frequency modulation (FDM/FM), companded FDM/FM 
(CFDM/FM), single channel per carrier/quadrature phase shift keying (SCPC/QPSK), 
TV/FM (TV transmissions using FM), time division multiple access (TDMA), 
QPSK/intermediate data rate (IDR), INTELSAT Business Services (IBS), Trellis-coded 
modulation (TCM)/IDR, and demand assigned multiple access (DAMA).  Trellis-coded 
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modulation is a modulation scheme which allows highly efficient transmission of 
information over band-limited channels (for example, telephone lines).  All of the 
aforementioned multiple access formats will be discussed in more detail later in this 
section [108]. 
 
2.3.2 INTELSAT Standard B 
INTELSAT’s Standard B terminal also operates in the C-band.  Its use began with 
the INTELSAT IV series satellites.  The Standard B terminals differ from the Standard A 
terminals in their use of smaller antenna sizes, ranging from approximately 11 to 13 m.  
The smaller antenna size again means a decrease in antenna gain, and therefore a higher 
per-circuit satellite usage charge.  The higher per-circuit usage charge is the reason why 
Standard A terminals are still more widely used than Standard B terminals today, despite 
the goal of the Standard B terminals to provide a lower-cost terminal for nations with 
modest communications traffic requirements (less than twenty-four voice circuits).  The 
modulation and multiple access formats used with Standard B terminals include:  
CFDM/FM (companding helps offset the lower antenna gain), SCPC/QPSK, TV/FM 
(transitioning away from TV/FM to digital TV transmission), QPSK/IDR, IBS, 
TCM/IDR, DAMA, and low-cost TDMA [108]. 
 
2.3.3 INTELSAT Standard C 
INTELSAT’s Standard C terminal’s use began with the INTELSAT V satellites.  
The Standard C terminal operates in the Ku-band.  Standard C terminals can incorporate 
two antennas separated by approximately 10 to 20 miles in order to overcome attenuation 
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due to rain via spatial diversity.  The Standard C terminals are generally utilized by 
nations with major communications requirements, as are the Standard A terminals, but 
these countries usually already have at least one Standard A terminal.  The modulation 
and multiple access formats that are compatible with the INTELSAT Standard C 
terminals include:  FDM/FM, CFDM/FM, QPSK/IDR, IBS, and TCM/IDR [108]. 
 
2.3.4 INTELSAT Standard D 
INTELSAT’s Standard D terminal, decommissioned in 1998, operated in the C-
band.  Standard D terminals were intended for use in places with very low satellite 
communications requirements, only about one to two voice circuits per terminal.  In 
general, Standard D terminals, which were lower-cost than Standard B terminals, were 
used by small islands in the Pacific and some African nations for communications 
between the rural areas and the countries’ capitals.  The only modulation and multiple 
access format used with the Standard D terminals was SCPC/companded frequency 
modulation (CFM) [108]. 
 
2.3.5 INTELSAT Standards E and F 
          INTELSAT’s Standard E and F terminals began use in the mid-1980s.  
They only differ by frequency band, Standard E operating in the Ku-band and Standard F 
operating in the C-band.  These two terminals are used particularly with IBS.  Instead of 
serving entire nations, Standards E and F are used to serve specific customer locations or 
multiple customers in small regions, for example a big city.  The modulation and multiple 
access formats compatible with Standard E terminals include:  QPSK/IDR, IBS, and 
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TCM/IDR.  The Standard F compatible modulation and multiple access formats are 
CFDM/FM, QPSK/IDR, IBS, TCM/IDR, and DAMA [108]. 
 
2.3.6 INTELSAT Standard G 
The INTELSAT Standard G terminals can be used in either the C-band or the Ku- 
band.  Standard G terminals are used for services offered by countries that lease or 
purchase INTELSAT capacity.  In the case of Standard G terminals, the network operator 
has the freedom to choose most system characteristics.  The terminal must simply abide 
by the rule that it cannot interfere with other satellite users.  This freedom to choose the 
terminal design characteristics means that all modulation and multiple access formats are 
acceptable, as long as INTELSAT agrees [108]. 
 
2.3.7 INTELSAT Standards H and K 
INTELSAT Standards H and K are like Standards E and F in that they only differ 
in frequency.  Standard H operates in the C-band and Standard K operates in the Ku-band.  
Standards H and K were implemented in the late 1990s.  Standards H and K employ even 
smaller antennas than Standards E and F.  The modulation and multiple access formats 
compatible with Standard H terminals include both IBS and DAMA.  For the Standard K 
terminals only IBS is compatible [108]. 
 
2.3.8 INTELSAT Services 
IDR services, introduced in 1984, provide digital communications to international 
public switched telephony networks (PSTNs) and are available on nearly all INTELSAT 
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satellites.  IDR utilizes QPSK modulation and shares transponders via frequency division 
multiple access (FDMA).  IDR is employed by INTELSAT Standards A, B, C, E, and F 
terminals.  It is the digital counterpart to the analog FM/FDMA carriers [2, 8, 108]. 
  IBS was also launched in 1984 and has the same transmission characteristics as 
IDR, except for a different data rate.  IBS is used for private communications via Earth 
terminals located at specific customer sites or in nearby cities.  Standards E, F, H, and K 
are used primarily for IBS [108].  Video conferencing is offered via occasional use IBS 
[2]. 
  Intelnet was set up in the mid-1980s and supports low rate transmission services 
to/from small terminals (2-8 feet in diameter).  These small terminals then communicate 
with larger hubs.  The multiple access formats and modulation techniques that can be 
used for Intelnet are FDMA or code division multiple access (CDMA) and binary phase 
shift keying (BPSK), QPSK, or spread spectrum [2, 108].  The Intelnet service is used to 
gather and disperse data between hubs and very small aperture terminals (VSATs) [2].   
For Intelnet leases, Earth stations are expected to meet the Standard G terminal 
specifications.  However, INTELSAT may approve terminals not meeting these 
specifications as “non-standard” terminals [10]. 
 
2.3.9 Very Small Aperture Terminals (VSATs) 
VSAT networks are in many cases used to connect and provide Internet protocol 
(IP)-based multimedia services to companies whose corporate offices and manufacturing, 
supply, and distribution centers are widely dispersed.  Each INTELSAT VSAT terminal 
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is interconnected via a large central hub which is located at a gateway Earth station.  
VSAT terminals, because they are small, are fairly inexpensive [2]. 
The INTELSAT system features several different types of VSAT networks, 
including:  data transaction-type networks; circuit-switched-type networks; video, audio, 
and data distribution-type networks; and micro-terminal-type networks [10]. 
Data transaction networks are the most frequently used type of INTELSAT VSAT 
network.  Two-way data transmission is the major function of this type of VSAT network.  
Data transaction networks have a star configuration (see Figure 1).  In this type of 
configuration a central hub functions as both a network control center (NCC) and a traffic 
gateway.  
 
 
Figure 1.  VSAT Network - Star Configuration 
 
Central hubs in this type of network serve to:  monitor links at the VSATs, configure the 
network, enable and disable VSATs, download software, collect network statistics, assign 
satellite capacity, and in some cases may also operate as a packet switch [10]. 
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Circuit-switched VSAT networks have a both pre-assigned circuits and demand-
assigned circuits, with demand assignment used only for voice circuits.  Mesh or star 
topologies are commonly used for this type of network (See Figure 2) [10].  In the case of 
a mesh configuration with demand assigned circuits, a VSAT uses a common signaling 
channel (CSC) to send a request to the hub Earth station that a link is set up between the 
requesting VSAT and another VSAT.  The hub Earth station informs the called VSAT 
that there has been a link request and then the hub assigns two channels to link the two 
VSATs.  When the call has ended, the channels are free to be used when another request 
is made.  In a mesh configuration with pre-assigned circuits, all networked VSATs use 
the same channel to receive and transmit, usually via a TDMA multiple access scheme 
[48]. 
 
 
Figure 2.  VSAT Network - Mesh Configuration 
 
Voice transmission is the main role of circuit-switched VSAT networks, with data 
transmission coming in second.  Video conferencing may also be available through these 
networks.  Assignment of voice circuits is done either from an NCC or via a distributed 
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control procedure.  The NCC also performs monitoring and control of network traffic, 
network configuration, generation of call records, software downloads, and data 
recording [10]. 
Video, audio, and data distribution VSAT networks typically have a star topology.  
In actuality, the network management systems for this type of VSAT network can operate 
with several traffic gateways (in a multi-star configuration).  Digital audio and data 
distribution networks often use a TDM carrier.  CDMA cannot be used for these 
networks [10]. 
Micro-terminal VSAT networks, which are used for portable communications, 
employ CDMA to alleviate interference problems caused by large antenna beamwidths.  
In particular, direct sequence spread spectrum (DSSS) CDMA is used.  As in the case of 
circuit-switched VSAT networks, voice transmission is the main function of these micro-
terminal networks.  Data and low-rate imagery applications can also be supported.  
Micro-terminal networks typically operate in a star configuration.  Operation in a multi-
star configuration is also possible [10]. 
In addition to the aforementioned multiple access schemes, there are also 
contention-based random access schemes such as Aloha and its variations that are 
generally used with VSATs.  In the case of unslotted Aloha, any user can transmit at any 
time.  If the information is received correctly, the receiving hub station sends an 
acknowledgement.  If no acknowledgement is received by the user, the information is 
retransmitted after waiting for a period of time.  With slotted Aloha, the packets are 
transmitted in time slots [84, 98]. 
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In addition to the previously mentioned Intelnet services, INTELSAT offers 
VSAT networks for domestic or international lease as part of INTELSAT’s multi-use 
transponder services offering.  For leases within the multi-use transponder services, Earth 
stations are expected to meet Standard G terminal specifications [10].   
INTELSAT also offers a service called Broadband VSAT (BVSAT), which is a 
bandwidth-on-demand service. The BVSAT network offers high speed networking for 
data, voice, video, and Internet traffic. As part of the BVSAT network, INTELSAT has 
located gateways in four major regions: Europe and the Middle East, Africa, the 
Americas, and the Asia-Pacific region.  BVSAT employs LINKWAY Infrastructure 
VSATs from Comsat Laboratories, a division of ViaSat [157]. 
LINKWAY is a “hubless” VSAT system which allows each terminal to use a 
range of bandwidth over multiple transponders. LINKWAY offers two VSAT system 
options:  LINKWAY 2100 and linkway.ip.  Both of these terminal types are interoperable 
over C- and Ku- band fixed satellite service (FSS) satellites, such as the INTELSAT 
COMSATs.  LINKWAY 2100 BVSAT networks can employ a mesh, star, or hybrid 
topology, which allows terminal to be capable of accessing all channels in the network 
(see Figure 3).  Therefore, each aforementioned network topology is available from a 
single platform.   
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Figure 3.  VSAT Network - Hybrid Configuration 
 
Linkway.ip specifically handles IP applications.  Some applications for which linkway.ip 
is ideal include:  Internet Service Provider (ISP) point of presence (PoP) connections, 
voice over IP (VoIP), and data and video multicasting [157]. 
INTELSAT’s VSAT network also offers services such as:  interoffice 
connectivity, point-of-sale transactions, virtual private networks (VPNs), local area 
networking (LAN) and wide area networking (WAN), Internet and Intranet, video 
conferencing, remote site networking, and VoIP [90]. 
 
2.4 Multiple Access Methods 
 
In a network where many Earth stations want to access the bandwidth of a single 
transponder, there are several possible methods available for gaining such access.  As 
mentioned previously, the INTELSAT Earth station standards and VSAT networks 
support a number of multiple access schemes.  These schemes are as follows:  FDMA, 
SCPC, multiple channels per carrier (MCPC), DAMA, TDMA, SS/TDMA, and CDMA.    
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2.4.1 FDMA 
FDMA was first used on INTELSAT I.  FDMA is an access method in which a 
portion of available radio frequency (RF) spectrum is divided into channels.  Each 
channel, operating at a different frequency, is assigned to a user to enable multiple users 
the ability to use this same portion of spectrum.  However, since users are assigned fixed 
amounts of bandwidth, it is difficult for bandwidth to be assigned to another user.  One of 
the disadvantages of using FDMA is that it can create intermodulation (IM) products.  
However, IM products can be avoided by operating the satellite’s traveling wave tube 
amplifiers (TWTAs) in their linear region, but this decreases the available output power.  
FDMA is less complex in terms of networking in comparison to TDMA.  The amount of 
Earth station equipment required when using FDMA increases as the amount of 
simultaneous connectivity increases [143].   See Figure 4 for an illustration of FDM. 
 
 
Figure 4.  Frequency Division Multiplexing (FDM) Illustration [101] 
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2.4.2 SCPC 
SCPC FDM/FM was first used on the INTELSAT II satellites [143].  In SCPC, 
one signal operates at a given frequency and bandwidth.  SCPC systems are typically 
used for voice applications.   SCPC carriers are pre-assigned and they share transponder 
power and bandwidth through FDMA.  SCPC is typically used for thin route 
communications traffic, and is as efficient as TDMA when employed with standard Earth 
stations [2, 143]. 
 
2.4.3 MCPC 
Like SCPC, multi-carrier FDM/FM (or MCPC) was first used on INTELSAT II 
series satellites and MCPC carriers are also pre-assigned.  For an MCPC system, multiple 
signals are combined into one bit stream before being modulated onto a carrier.  This 
carrier can then be transmitted to multiple remote sites.  Because all signals have to be 
sent to a single location before being combined for transmission, MCPC is at a major 
disadvantage compared to SCPC in terms of transmission time.  MCPC is very efficient 
with heavy traffic.  In the case of light traffic, the pre-assigned channels go unused and 
cannot be reallocated [143]. 
 
2.4.4 DAMA 
Demand assignment is used when communications traffic peaks above pre-
assigned channel capacity or in the case of terminals with no pre-assigned channels [108]. 
A DAMA system can be employed to offer thin routes between PSTN international 
gateways (for example, Standard A terminals) to support telephony, fax, and data 
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services.  A DAMA system can function with Earth stations as small as 1.8 m (i.e. 
VSATs, in this case used in a star network configuration).   DAMA systems increase 
usage efficiency, thereby releasing transponder capacity to be used for other services.  
Modulation for DAMA systems is typically chosen to be either QPSK or BPSK [9]. 
 
2.4.5 SCPC Pulse Code Modulation (PCM) Multiple Access Demand Assignment 
Equipment (SPADE) 
INTELSAT’s use of demand assignment systems, its first digital communications 
system, began in the early 1970s with SPADE, the use of which ended in 1993 [2, 108].  
SPADE is a system in which every channel is shared and assigned according to demand 
[143].  SPADE is typically employed by Standard B terminals [108]. 
In SPADE systems, a signal is modulated onto a carrier using QPSK.   The carrier 
is then dynamically assigned according to demand.  If there is no speech detected, the 
carrier will be turned off.  SPADE carriers are dynamically assigned over a common 
signaling channel (CSC).  Each Earth station monitors the CSC and is aware of the 
present state of channel allotments.  The CSC is divided up into time slots for Earth 
stations to request and release channels.  SPADE’s utilization of bandwidth is more 
efficient than MCPC and is proportionate to that of SCPC.  A SPADE transponder having 
800 channels is approximately equal to an MCPC transponder with 3200 channels [143]. 
 
2.4.6 TDMA 
TDMA has been employed by the INTELSAT system since 1985, specifically in 
conjunction with INTELSAT Standard A terminals.  Application of TDMA to 
 22
INTELSAT Standard B terminals was also made possible by the use of improved forward 
error correction (FEC) decoding schemes [9].  Earth stations can typically not see their 
own transmissions with INTELSAT’s TDMA systems [2]. 
TDMA is a multiple access scheme which shares a channel by dividing it into 
different timeslots. Signals are transmitted one after another in rapid succession in their 
specific timeslot (See Figure 5) [101, 143].  TDMA allows for variation in the allocation 
of these timeslots based on current user needs [62]. 
 
 
Figure 5.  Time Division Multiplexing Illustration 
 
Precise synchronization between Earth stations and satellites, made possible by precise 
clocks and high speed switching elements, is essential to TDMA so the signals arrive at 
the satellite in the correct position in the TDMA frame [143].  Since TDMA uses only 
one carrier at a time, IM products cannot occur as they can in FDMA [101].  Also, 
TDMA provides greater capacity than FDMA systems [108].  One disadvantage of using 
a TDMA scheme is that they cause transmission delays for other Earth stations that may 
be waiting to utilize the same transponder bandwidth [62]. 
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2.4.7 SS/TDMA 
TDMA is well-suited to connecting beams sequentially, which is part of the 
reason for INTELSAT’s switch to SS/TDMA in 1990 [9, 143].  SS/TDMA was first used 
on the INTELSAT VI series satellites.  The fast switch matrices of INTELSAT VI’s 
communications subsystem allowed its repeaters to independently connect to any of six 
beams for reception and for transmission.  This allows Earth stations in different regions 
to communicate with one another [108].  Complete interconnectivity of a total of N 
beams can be achieved with N! different satellite switch modes.  SS/TDMA was not 
reused on an INTELSAT system until the INTELSAT IX series satellites, likely due to 
switch matrix complexity.  SS/TDMA systems significantly boost the satellite’s capacity 
in comparison to FDMA systems [108, 143]. 
 
2.4.8 CDMA 
As mentioned previously, CDMA systems can be used with the INTELSAT 
VSAT networks, particularly in conjunction with INTELSAT’s Intelnet services.   
CDMA uses spread spectrum technology and a coding scheme in which each transmitter 
is assigned a particular code.  CDMA divides the signal space, as opposed to TDMA’s 
division of time and FDMA’s division of frequency.  More efficient use of bandwidth is 
an effect of partitioning the signal space.  In addition, the assigned codes offer a level of 
security in that they can only be decoded by their intended receiver.  CDMA is not very 
susceptible to frequency jamming due in part to its design allowing for flexibility in 
center frequency, spread rate, and power level.  Also, frequency reuse can be 
accomplished with CDMA without causing unwanted co-channel interference.  One 
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disadvantage of CDMA is that it is vulnerable to strong, undesired signals at the receiver 
blocking weaker, desired user signals from gaining access to the bandwidth [62]. 
 
2.5 Emerging and Proposed Systems 
 
 
Over the past forty years in satellite development, the typical approach has been 
to keep the satellites as simple as possible, keeping the complexity on the ground.  This 
was done to minimize the damages caused by catastrophic satellite failures.  In recent 
years, the on-board complexity of satellites has been increasing with the incorporation of 
on-board processing into satellite communications payloads.  On-board processing 
involves frequency translating and re-amplifying the received signal, as well as 
processing it down to the bit level by decoding, de-interleaving, and demodulating it on-
board [45]. 
 At present, in addition to on-board processing, the U.S. and several other 
countries are in the process of developing satellite laser communications systems.  Laser-
based communications systems, in addition to providing faster communication, could 
help to protect communications links against traditional jamming techniques [146]. 
 
2.5.1 Internet Routing in Space (IRIS) 
One current U.S. military project could potentially benefit commercial satellite 
communications.  The project is called IRIS or Internet Routing in Space.  In fact, the 
U.S. Department of Defense has chosen the INTELSAT General Corporation, a 
subsidiary of INTELSAT Ltd to manage the IRIS project [25].   The IRIS payload is 
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intended to be carried on-board the INTELSAT 14 satellite, which is planned to be 
launched during the second quarter of 2009 [25, 147]. 
 INTELSAT has a contract with Space Systems/Loral (SS/L) for the 
manufacturing of INTELSAT 14.  The satellite is based on SS/L’s 1300 series satellite 
platform, and has a design lifetime of 15 years.  The satellite carries 40 C-band and 22 
Ku-band transponders.  It is intended to be located at 45 degrees West longitude where it 
will be capable of providing coverage of the Americas, Europe, and Africa via its four 
coverage beams [147]. 
The IRIS project will come to fruition with the help of commercial industry 
participants, such as SEAKR Engineering, Inc.  SEAKR Engineering, Inc. manufactures 
the IP router for the IRIS payload.  According to the Management Plan for the Internet 
Protocol Routing In Space (IRIS) Joint Capability Technology Demonstration (JCTD), 
“the commercially-owned/operated IRIS payload aboard IS 14 (INTELSAT 14) may 
connect to the Department of Defense (DoD)-controlled global information grid (GIG) 
and promote developing policy-based network management for satellite 
communications” [106]. 
The IRIS program benefits the commercial satellite communications community 
in the following ways:  providing IP routing capability between satellites, reducing 
transmission times, providing satellite capacity savings, and increasing networking 
flexibility.   The on-board router would eliminate the need for a signal’s round trip to an 
Earth station, thereby decreasing the number of needed Earth stations.  IRIS’ IP routing 
technology will allow transponders to communicate with one another by “decoding what 
comes up in the C-band or Ku-band and interconnecting the two” [25]. 
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2.6 Hacking Satellite Communications Links 
 
2.6.1 Tamil Tigers Liberation Front 
The Tamil Tigers Liberation Front (or Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam - LTTE), 
a Sri Lankan separatist group known as terrorist in at least 32 countries, have recently 
been blamed for illegally using INTELSAT satellites to broadcast radio and TV 
transmissions via the use of an empty transponder on-board INTELSAT 12 [51, 144]. 
INTELSAT 12 was formerly known as Europe Star 1, a PanAmSat satellite, until 
PanAmSat was acquired by INTELSAT Ltd in July 2006 [51].  LTTE was broadcasting 
their “National Television of Tamil Eelam and Pulikalin Kural (‘Voice of Tigers’) radio 
transmissions” for four hours each day across INTELSAT 12’s transponder 2.  The 
uplink transmissions are believed to have come from within Vavuniya, northern Sri 
Lanka, according to Sri Lankan intelligence officials [51].  
INTELSAT 12 is a bent-pipe satellite, which is the most common type of 
communications satellite on orbit, mainly due to the fact that this type of satellite is much 
less expensive than those with on-board processing.  When bent-pipe transponders are 
not being fully-used, the empty transponders can be identified by a spectrum analyzer in 
combination with a satellite receive antenna.  These empty transponders are configured to 
retransmit any signal being sent to them.  The uplink signal from the hijacker is 
transmitted to the satellite in a highly-directed beam which makes finding the hijacker 
extremely difficult [51, 144].  There are systems available for locating interferences, but 
these systems only can find the general area where the interference came from [144].  
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2.6.2 TLS NexGen Interference Locating System 
The TLS NexGen system by Transmitter Location Systems, LLC is one system 
used to locate interferences.  Optional software is available that can be added to TLS 
NexGen making it able to geolocate interferences with only one satellite’s orbital 
elements (usually an adjacent satellite).  This software is called Single Satellite 
Ephemeris Solution (SSES).  Orbital elements from an adjacent satellite that is receiving 
sidelobe energy from the interfering signal in addition to orbital elements of the satellite 
receiving the interference are necessary for TLS NexGen without SSES.  TLS NexGen 
finds the transmitter’s location by calculating the difference in arrival times and 
frequencies caused by transmitting the interfering signal through two satellites [151].    In 
the time difference of arrival (TDOA) technique, the difference in the arrival time of the 
interfering signal from the two satellites is used to determine a longitudinal line of 
position (LOP).  In the frequency difference of arrival (FDOA) technique, frequency 
difference of the interfering signals from the two satellites due to the motion of the 
satellites is used to determine a latitudinal LOP.  Where the TDOA and FDOA LOPs 
intersect is a probability ellipse that contains the interference location [13].  Position 
accuracy of the transmitter’s location is typically within a few kilometers.  TLS also has a 
global network of processing stations, with stations located in Bosque Alegre, Argentina; 
Perth, Australia; Ontario, Canada; Beijing, China; Hong Kong, China; Paris, France; 
Fucino, Italy; Mexico City, Mexico; Pretoria, South Africa; and Dubai, United Arab 
Emirates.  Data from these stations on interference incidents is sent to the Global 
Operations Center in Chantilly, Virginia for processing [151]. 
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2.6.3 Falun Gong 
Another satellite interference event occurred in 2002 when the Falun Gong 
hacked the SinoSat satellite.  The interferences on SinoSat were traced back to a “pirate 
broadcast operation in Taipei, Taiwan.” This interference event disrupted broadcasts of 
China Central TV (CCTV) to remote regions of China and transmission of China 
Education TV and in some cases cut off TV entirely in the rural and mountainous regions.  
CCTV is a Chinese government-run network.  The Falun Gong continually attempts to 
broadcasts its transmissions proclaiming the benefits of being a member of the group and 
attempting to convince the rest of the Chinese citizens that they have been unfairly 
treated by Chinese authorities [17, 51, 144].  In fact, in November 2004 the Falun Gong 
hacked into AsiaSat and disrupted signals for approximately four hours [51]. 
 
2.6.4 Other Jamming Events 
In 2006, Thuraya mobile satellite communications were jammed by Libyan 
nationals for nearly six months.   In this case, the jamming was aimed at Thuraya satellite 
phone-using smugglers of contraband into Libya.  During the 2006 Israel-Lebanon war, 
Israel attempted to jam the Al-Manar satellite channel which is transmitted by the Arab 
Satellite Communications Organization (ARABSAT), illustrating the potential for 
commercial satellites to become targets during conflict [146]. 
 
2.6.5 Conclusions 
This ability to hack into commercial COMSATs could lead to a disastrous 
situation in regards to worldwide communications.  Potentially, a hijacked satellite in 
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geostationary Earth orbit (GEO) could be directed to crash into another nearby satellite 
causing a lot of damage not just to the other satellite but to many satellites in GEO due to 
the debris this crash would create.  Al-Qaeda being able to use COMSATs in order to 
launch an attack against the U.S. may even be possible [144].  It appears that nearly 
everyone could pirate satellite capacity if they wanted.  In fact, Extreme Media of Garden 
City, Michigan reportedly is selling the following videos from its website:  “Satellite 
Piracy” and “Hacking Digital Satellite Systems” [51]. 
There are several ways that COMSATs can be protected from potential 
interferences, including:  data encryption, the use of error protection coding which makes 
greater the amount of interference that is acceptable before communications are disrupted, 
the employment of directional antennas which reduce vulnerability to jamming, and 
shielding which decreases the amount of energy that can be intercepted for the purpose of 
jamming.  Further protection capabilities are available, but are currently primarily used 
for military COMSATs.  These protection capabilities are as follows:  narrowband 
excision schemes that use less bandwidth, burst transmissions and frequency hopping 
techniques that prevent potential jammers from “locking-on” to signals, antenna side lobe 
reduction increase the focus of the main communications beam and reduce jamming 
incidents in the beam side lobes, and nulling antenna systems which observe interference 
and combine antenna elements developed to cancel interference [146]. 
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2.7 Summary 
 
The U.S.’s heavy reliance on and need to protect its space assets is apparent.  In 
fact during the Gulf War, the U.S. relied heavily on the INTELSAT fleet of commercial 
COMSATs.  Therefore, a brief history of INTELSAT and the evolution of INTELSAT’s 
satellite capacity were discussed in this chapter.  A brief discussion of the INTELSAT 
satellite access points identified a few of the possible areas where space systems may be 
vulnerable to attack, to include the Earth stations, VSAT networks, and multiple access 
methods.  A more in-depth analysis of a typical space system’s access points will be 
provided in Chapter 3 as the next step to achieving the end-goal of providing a 
vulnerabilities assessment of a space system.   
 This chapter highlighted several emerging (or proposed) satellite system 
technologies, including on-board processing, satellite laser communications, and Internet 
routing in space (IRIS).  This information will allow an assessment of future 
vulnerabilities of space systems and possible ways to protect these emerging systems 
from attack.   
 Finally, to illustrate the susceptibility of U.S. space systems to attack, several 
examples were provided of hacking events involving satellite communications links that 
have occurred in the recent past.  These include the hacking of INTELSAT 12 by the 
Tamil Tigers Liberation Front and the hacking of SinoSat by the Chinese Falun Gong.  
Several ways to stop these RF interference events from taking place were discussed, such 
as:  using an interference locating system, data encryption, error protection coding, 
frequency hopping, and antenna sidelobe reduction.   
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III: Methodology 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
 
 In order for the U.S. to develop ways to protect its space assets, it is necessary 
first to understand the vulnerabilities of the U.S.’s space assets.  To accomplish this 
vulnerabilities assessment, the space systems need to be analyzed at the component-level 
in order to determine possible access points for attackers.  As stated in Chapter 2, the 
Earth stations and the communications links (between user terminals, Earth stations, 
NOCs, and satellites) are the most vulnerable components of U.S. satellite systems to 
attack.  Therefore, it is necessary to take a closer look at these components to determine 
possible access points in each.   
 
3.2 Satellite 
 
 
A typical satellite communications link involves a satellite and two or more Earth 
terminals.  Information is exchanged between the satellite and these terminals via RF 
antennas located on-board the satellite and at the Earth station facilities (or user 
locations).  The antennas are the main access points to the satellite.  Access to 
information being passed across the satellite goes even further than just the antennas.  It 
passes from the antennas to one of the many on-board transponders.   In a typical bent-
pipe satellite, the transponders amplify the information signal and frequency-translate it 
before transmitting it back down to the ground.  Transponder amplifiers are usually either 
traveling-wave tube amplifier (TWTA)-type or solid state power amplifier (SSPA)-type.  
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In the case of INTELSAT 14, which is the satellite intended to carry the IRIS 
payload, there will be an access router on-board the satellite.   The access router will not 
only be able to route incoming information to the proper destination, but it will also 
enable all elements of the satellite to be addressed individually via IP and be 
interconnected via on-board routing [145].  See Figure 6 for an illustration of the 
breakdown of the satellite access points.    
 
 
 
 
Notice that only the TWTA-type power amplifiers are shown in Figure 6.  This is due to 
the fact that this type of power amplifier is susceptible to high-voltage breakdown.  
SSPAs do not have these types of failure modes [158].   
Figure 6.  Satellite Breakdown Showing Access Point Components 
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3.2.1 Satellite Access Router 
Since Internet routing in space is an emerging advancement in satellite 
communications technology, there is no current standard for the on-board access router’s 
implementation and usage.  Therefore, examining a specific example where Internet 
routing in space will be implemented is necessary.  This discussion will focus on the IRIS 
payload to be carried on the INTELSAT 14 satellite.   
The IRIS payload will be capable of interconnecting between the C-band and Ku-
band communications payloads on INTELSAT-14.  This interconnectivity will allow 
“flexible reconfigurable IP packet routing,” enabling a C-band user to directly 
communicate with a Ku-band user and vice versa.  All of this is to be accomplished 
without the use of an Earth station relay [106].   
 In the case of the IRIS payload, the uplink signal received by the satellite will first 
be demodulated and decoded before being routed by the on-board access router on a 
packet-by-packet basis (See Figure 7.).  The router allows for voice, video, and data 
packets all to be transmitted simultaneously, thereby more efficiently utilizing each 
transponder than in the case of a bent-pipe COMSAT [106].   
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Figure 7.  IRIS Payload Diagram 
 
An illustration of the IRIS access router from SEAKR Engineering, Inc. is shown in 
Figure 8 below [138].   
 
 
Figure 8.  IRIS Access Router Configuration 
 
 
3.2.2 Transponders 
In general, COMSATs carry multiple transponders which are separated in 
frequency to avoid interference.  Bent-pipe transponders receive the incoming 
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information signals, amplify them, frequency-translate them, and separate them into 
individual transponder channels before re-transmitting them to the required destination.  
Figure 9 shows the basic structure of a bent-pipe transponder [57].  In order to get the 
most out of any transponder, multiple signals are usually passed through each 
transponder using a multiple access scheme.  As discussed in Chapter 2, there are several 
multiple access schemes that can be utilized, such as:  CDMA, TDMA, and FDMA, as 
well as variations of each of these [54, 58].   
 
 
Figure 9.  Basic Structure of a Bent-Pipe Satellite Transponder 
 
CDMA allows multiple signals to be sent across each transponder by assigning a 
unique code sequence for each signal.  This type of multiple access scheme is used for 
secure communications.  TDMA allows the entire transponder bandwidth to be used by 
one user for a limited period of time and once that time is up another user gets their turn.  
Multi-frequency (MF)-TDMA is popular for use with VSATs.  MF-TDMA employs 
frequency hopping to time and bandwidth utilization.  With FDMA, each user is assigned 
a frequency band.  FDMA is used, for example, for point-to-point connectivity [54, 58].   
 The aforementioned types of multiple accesses are considered fixed assignment 
multiple access schemes.  DAMA may also be used in which bandwidth is allocated 
based on user demand.  Bandwidth allocation is controlled at the Network Operations 
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Center (NOC) (or on-board the satellite in the case of a satellite with on-board processing 
capabilities).Combined Free DAMA (CFDAMA) allows unused channels to be accessed 
in a round-robin manner [84].   
 
3.2.3 TWTAs 
As mentioned previously there are generally two types of high power amplifiers 
(HPAs) that are used on COMSATs, either the TWTA or the SSPA.  TWTAs are more 
efficient than SSPAs; however TWTAs require relatively high voltages whereas SSPAs 
operate at low DC voltages.  Therefore, TWTAs can be exposed to a number of possible 
failure modes, such as high voltage breakdown [110, 154].  High voltage breakdown 
failures can cause spurious discharges and even TWT failure [158].   
 
3.3 Earth Station 
 
 
As stated in the previous section, the satellite’s on-board antennas are the main 
access points to the satellite.  The satellite’s antennas are used to pass messages between 
Earth stations, NOCs, and user terminals.  Earth stations act as interfaces between the 
space segments (the satellites) and the terrestrial networks, accessing the satellites’ 
antennas by way of their own antennas on the ground.   The Earth stations also act as 
central hubs for VSAT networks, receiving data from the surrounding VSATs and 
routing it accordingly.  Each Earth station is connected to a network of other Earth 
stations and the NOC via the satellite.  The Earth station network interconnects each 
Earth station and the users in the terrestrial fixed networks in the region which the Earth 
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station covers.  User terminals can access this Earth station network via network access 
points (NAPs).   Each Earth station is also connected to the satellite’s entire network of 
Earth stations across the globe, allowing interconnections to other Earth stations in 
regions outside of the coverage area of the local Earth station [81].  See Figure 10 for a 
breakdown of Earth station access points.   
In the case of on-board processing satellites, NAPs can be located directly at the 
user’s location, providing direct access to the NOC.  The on-board processor of the 
satellite is capable of routing user information without the need for sending it first 
through an Earth station [102].   
 
 
Figure 10.  Earth Station Breakdown Showing Access Point Components 
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The access point components linked to the antenna were analyzed in the previous section 
and will not be analyzed here. The Earth station’s VSAT data reception capability will be 
discussed first.   
 
3.3.1 VSAT Data Reception 
VSATs access satellites to relay data from user terminals to Earth stations if 
operating in a star configuration.  If operating in a mesh configuration, the data can be 
relayed from one user terminal to another user terminal via satellite without the need for a 
centralized Earth station hub.  In some cases a combination of these topologies is used.  
For example, several Earth stations (with VSATs connecting to them in star 
configurations) can be connected in a multi-star topology.  Each star (Earth station and 
connecting VSATs) is then connected to every other star in a mesh configuration [156]. 
Refer to Chapter 2 for more details on VSAT network topologies.   
 
3.3.2 Earth Station Network 
Each Earth station that is in the coverage area of the satellite is connected to every 
other Earth station in the coverage area via the satellite, thus creating an Earth station 
network.  This Earth station network is interconnected with the NOC.  User terminals 
access the Earth station network via NAPs.  User terminals can access the NAPs directly 
or by using ad hoc routing paths through other mobile terminals in the network [21]. 
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3.4 Network Operations Center (NOC) 
 
 
The NOC is connected to each Earth station via the Earth station network, and it 
controls the network of user terminals.  The NOC provides a web-based interface for 
users which is used in disseminating data, a connection to a terrestrial fiber network 
through fiber access points for public and private networks, and controls access to 
services [122].  In addition, the NOC can be utilized to connect user terminals in one 
beam to user terminals in other beams [24].   
 Whereas in the case of the IRIS payload, the access router is carried on-board the 
satellite, in general access routers are located at the NOC.  As mentioned previously, 
access routers route information packets on a packet-by-packet basis to and from user 
terminals and Earth stations.  See Figure 11 for a breakdown of NOC access points. 
 
 
Figure 11.  Network Operations Center Breakdown Showing Access Point Components 
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Note that in the case of an on-board processing satellite, the on-board processing payload 
allows inter-beam connectivity, enabling user terminals in one beam to access user 
terminals, Earth stations, and NOCs in other beams.  These types of satellites do not 
require the NOC in order to connect to other beams [24].   
 
 
3.4.1 NOC Access Router 
As seen in Figure 11, access routers allow (or deny) access to services.  These 
services can range from dial-up connections to on-demand cable services to wireless 
Internet access.  The NOC access router can also provide access to Internet service 
provider (ISP) critical services.  “Critical services” usually refers to situations in which a 
“priority dial tone” is provided.  These situations typically involve national security 
and/or emergency preparedness [14, 60].  In addition, the NOC access router helps 
provide Earth station network security by allowing the NOC manager to control access to 
services [37].   
 
3.4.2 Fiber Network 
The NOC is connected to a private, terrestrial fiber network which provides users 
and Earth stations access to the Internet or to a private Intranet.  The links between the 
NOC and the terrestrial fiber network are usually protected with network firewalls [21].  
Internet (and Intranet) access services, such as web browsing, file transfer protocol (FTP), 
email, and peer-to-peer, provide user terminals and Earth stations access to public (or 
private) Internet protocol (IP) networks.  In order to provide email services through 
 41
private IP networks, access to external networks (such as the Internet) is necessary [16].   
See Figure 12 for a breakdown of the access points of the terrestrial fiber network. 
 
 
Figure 12.  Fiber Network Breakdown of Access Points 
 
FTP is a network protocol for sending data between computers through a network, such 
as the Internet [64].  Peer-to-peer refers to a network that connects computers via mostly 
ad hoc connections.  This type of network can be used to offer a variety of services, 
including:  audio, video, and data file sharing or sending telephony traffic [123].   
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3.5 User Terminals 
 
 
User terminals make it possible to access corporate Intranets, the Internet, and 
cellular networks from anywhere worldwide by way of satellite connectivity.  If a user is 
not in a satellite coverage region but wants to access a service offered by this satellite, the 
user can access it through a satellite service provider (SSP).  The user will connect to the 
SSP via a terrestrial IP network, such as the Internet [16].  ISPs, for example, provide 
Internet access to their customers in remote locations directly or via points-of-presence 
(PoPs) using wireless links [6].  In these remote locations where there is no access to 
landlines, user terminals can be connected to standard PC devices to allow access to the 
desired multimedia services [77].  
Mobile user terminals can be used for both cellular network and satellite access.  
When the terminal is within range of the terrestrial cellular network, the user can connect 
through the terrestrial network.  When the user is outside of the terrestrial network’s 
range, the terminal provides cellular access via satellite connectivity [77].  See Figure 13 
for a breakdown of user terminal access points.   
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Figure 13.  User Terminals Breakdown Showing Access Point Components 
  
 
3.5.1 Wireless Network Adapter 
As mentioned previously, user terminals can connect to local Earth station NAPs 
directly.  These connections may be made through a wireless network adapter at the user 
location.  The network adapter controls access rights and provides network services [44].   
 
3.5.2 Points-of-Presence (PoPs) 
 A PoP enables users to access company Intranets, the Internet, and cellular 
networks through a local phone number or a dedicated landline [107].  PoP routers 
provide access points for user connections.  Users can connect to the PoP routers with a 
supported serial interface.  Access to the router can be provided by one of many protocols, 
such as:  high-level data link control (HDLC), link access procedure balanced (LAPB), or 
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point-to-point protocol (PPP) [77].  See Figure 14 for a breakdown of the PoP access 
points. 
 
Figure 14.  Points-of-Presence Access Points Breakdown 
 
 
HDLC is a “bit-oriented synchronous data link layer protocol”.  It is used to 
transfer data packets between nodes in a network regardless of packet contents.  HDLC 
provides connection-oriented and connectionless protocol services.  Connection-oriented 
protocols associate traffic flows with an integer connection identifier which makes 
network switches faster.  An example of a connection-oriented protocol is transmission 
control protocol (TCP)/IP.  Connectionless protocols allow messages to be sent between 
two network nodes without prior arrangement of the transmission.  An example of a 
connectionless protocol is IP.  HDLC is typically used for point-to-point communications 
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using asynchronous balanced mode (ABM).  ABM supports peer-to-peer 
communications [79].   
LAPB is a bit-oriented data link layer protocol derived from HDLC.  It is in the 
X.25 protocol stack.  X.25 is a network layer protocol for packet-switched wide area 
network (WAN) communications.  X.25’s major use is in processing credit card 
transactions and for automatic teller machines (ATMs).  LAPB ensures that packets are 
free of errors and in the right order sequentially [103].   
 PPP is a data link layer protocol that is typically used to make direct connections 
between two network nodes via a land line or cellular telephone.  Most ISPs use PPP for 
dial-up Internet access.  PPP works with a variety of network layer protocols, such as IP 
[127]. 
 
3.5.3 Standard PC Devices 
Portable user terminals make multimedia services accessible anywhere in the 
world.  User terminals can be connected to standard PC devices to allow users in remote 
locations access to these services.  The user terminal to PC device connection is made via 
personal computer memory card international association ((PCMCIA) or equivalent) 
interface ports [81].  The PCMCIA interface is designed for laptop computers.  All 
PCMCIA (or simply PC) cards use a 68 pin dual-row connecting interface.  They can 
have either a 16- or a 32- bit interface [121].   
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3.6 Summary 
 
 
Each piece of a typical space system, to include the satellite, the Earth stations, 
the NOC, and the user terminals, has been broken down to the component-level.  Possible 
access points for attackers were determined in each.   Now an assessment of the 
vulnerabilities associated with these access points can be made.   
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IV: Results 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
 
 The multitude of vulnerabilities associated with a space system’s access points 
will be presented and analyzed, beginning with those of the space segment (or satellite).  
From this analysis, the most vulnerable component of each segment (space, Earth, and 
user) of the space system will be determined.  A specific example relating to an emerging 
space system, IRIS, will present a possible attack methodology for this system as well as 
other similar systems.  The information provided in this chapter serves to warn 
developers of future space systems of the susceptibility of their systems to the types of 
attacks mentioned and the need to take steps to prevent these attacks from occurring.  
 
4.2 Space Segment Vulnerabilities 
 
 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, in regards to a typical Earth-orbiting 
satellite, there are three access points which may be susceptible to vulnerabilities.  These 
are the antennas, the transponders, and the TWTAs.  In addition, in relation to the 
emerging IRIS payload to be carried on INTELSAT 14, the on-board access router may 
also be considered a vulnerable access point. 
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4.2.1 Satellite Antenna Vulnerabilities 
The satellite’s on-board antennas and the RF links being sent to and from them 
may be susceptible to both environmental and human factors.  These factors can degrade 
antenna operations intentionally or unintentionally.  The causes of unintentional antenna 
performance degradation can include:  unintentional RF interference from the side lobes 
of an adjacent satellite, due to equipment error, due to human (operator) error, from the 
satellite’s own or another nearby Earth station, and ionospheric interference during solar 
max; frequency spectrum congestion; multipath; and physical damage caused by the 
surrounding environment.  The causes of intentional satellite antenna performance 
degradation include:  intentional RF interference (i.e. RF jamming), spoofing (or 
intrusion), meaconing (described below), and deliberate physical attack.   
When a signal is masked by another RF signal or by natural RF emissions, such as 
during solar max or emissions from other on-board equipment, this is deemed 
unintentional interference [27].  An illustration of antenna side lobe interference is shown 
in Figure 15.   
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Figure 15.  Antenna Side Lobe Interference Illustration [118] 
 
An Earth station that is located nearby the satellite’s Earth station could be transmitting at 
the same time as the satellite’s Earth station.  RF interference from the nearby Earth 
station’s antenna’s side lobes could reach the satellite antenna at the same time as the 
intended signal, thereby causing interference with the intended signal if the two signals 
are of the same frequency.  This side lobe interference can also be caused by an adjacent 
satellite’s antennas [118]. Antenna pointing errors are a main contributor to side lobe 
interference.  These pointing errors can come from misalignment, foundation settling, 
spacecraft station-keeping or wind deflection among other factors.  An error in antenna 
pointing results in an increase in antenna gain in the direction of an adjacent satellite.  
Signals from the adjacent satellites can then interfere with the intended signal [28].  Also, 
notice from Figure 15 that RF interference from terrestrial sources, such as microwave 
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towers, can cause interference in the signal being transmitted to the satellite by entering 
through the signal’s side lobes.   
 As can be seen in Figure 16, an antenna’s main lobe contains the majority of the 
beam power.  Typically, the side lobes have at most 18 decibels less power than the main 
lobe.  However, the side lobes still radiate strong enough to cause signal interference.   
 
 
Figure 16.  Typical Antenna Beam Pattern [118] 
 
Decibels represent a power ratio.  They express how many times more or less 
power is contained in a signal (in this case, the side lobes), compared to a certain 
reference signal (in this case, the main lobe).  Decibels are defined by the following 
equation:   
dB = 10 * log10(P2/P1)   [Equation 1] 
 
log10 = logarithm, base 10 
 
P1 = the power of the signal we are interested in (from the 
side lobes) 
 
P2 = the power of the reference signal (from the main lobe) 
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 When the spring and fall equinoxes occur each year, the Sun crosses the equator 
and passes directly behind each satellite in the GEO belt (See Figure 17.).  This causes 
the main beam of the Earth station receive antenna to be in direct line-of-sight with the 
Sun, causing Sun outage.  The Earth station receive antenna picks up the Sun’s 
interference, which overwhelms the satellite signal resulting in the Sun’s noise being the 
only thing heard at the receive end.  Sun outage lasts for approximately ten minutes [118]. 
 
 
Figure 17.  Sun Outage Illustration [104] 
 
Since bandwidth is in high demand and the frequency spectrum is limited, the 
spectrum is congested with users.  Previously unused portions of the frequency spectrum, 
 52
such as the Ka-band, are beginning to be used in emerging systems in order to meet 
demand.  Also, satellites are employing frequency reuse techniques, such as dual-
polarization and spot beams.  The International Frequency Registration Board (IFRB) 
(formerly International Telecommunication Union (ITU)) is in charge of allocating this 
frequency spectrum to different users.  Interference can occur when simultaneously 
transmitting satellites (or Earth stations) are using frequencies that are too close together, 
implying that the channel spacing (or frequency guard bands) is not wide enough.  
Insufficient channel spacing can cause overlapping of frequency sidebands and carrier 
frequencies of adjacent satellites (or sidebands of adjacent satellites can cause 
interference with the carrier frequency of the satellite in question).  The sidebands are 
bands of frequencies that are higher or lower than the carrier frequency that contain 
energy.  These sidebands result from the signal modulation process.  Congestion of the 
frequency spectrum causes difficulty in discriminating the intended signal from the 
adjacent satellite (or Earth station) signal and can result in interference due to slight 
frequency shifts or phase shifts due to ionospheric reflection.  Ionospheric reflection is a 
bending of the signal back toward the Earth, which depends on the signal’s frequency, 
angle at which the signal is sent traveling through the ionosphere (i.e. angle of incidence), 
signal polarization, and ionospheric conditions.  These ionospheric conditions include 
electron density, which indicates the amount of ionization in the atmosphere.   
Atmospheric ionization increases with increases in solar activity [66]. 
 Multipath occurs when RF signals reflect or refract off of objects as they travel 
from the satellite to the Earth station and vice versa.  These objects can include structures 
surrounding the receive antenna such as buildings, as well as objects in the atmosphere 
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such as ions (as described in relation to ionospheric reflection above).   The transmitted 
signal can also bend due to changes in refractive index as it travels through the 
atmosphere.  Passing through various mediums also causes a change in signal velocity.  
Refractive index is a measure of how much the speed of light decreases when traveling 
through a particular medium, such as the atmosphere.  Multipath can cause signal fading 
due to the reflected signal, which will reach the antenna after the intended signal, 
interfering with the intended signal.  The combined received signal (intended plus 
reflected) suffers from time-varying fading [57].  See Figure 18 for an example of 
multipath fading. 
 
 
Figure 18.  Multipath Signal Fading Illustration [31] 
 
When a signal is refracted, there is a change in signal polarization.  When the 
signal is reflected, the polarization is reversed (for example from right-handed circular to 
left-handed circular polarization).  In this case, when the reflected and intended signals 
meet at the antenna, they will cancel each other.  The two signals will only cancel each 
other completely if the polarization was fully-reversed in the reflected signal and if the 
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amplitudes of both of the signals are equal.  Otherwise, the multipath signal will only 
partially cancel the intended signal.  If the multipath signal goes through two reflections 
before arriving at the antenna, it will have reversed its polarization twice resulting in the 
multipath signal ending up with the same polarization as the intended signal.  If these two 
signals converge at the antenna, the two signals will add causing the amplitude of the 
total received signal to be increased.  These variations in signal amplitude can cause 
problems for the automatic gain controller (AGC) which is supposed to keep the signal 
levels constant [119]. 
With the antennas being one of the major objects protruding from the satellite’s 
surface, they are obviously one of the most vulnerable of the satellite’s components to 
physical damage.  This damage could come from any number of objects in the space 
environment, to include space debris and possibly even meteoroids.  Also, the space 
environment itself may cause damage to the antenna.  Outgassing of materials may occur, 
as well as damage caused by the extreme temperatures.  Outgassing is the slow release of 
a gas that was trapped in a material.  The gas can be released from cracks or impurities in 
a metal, as well as from sealants, lubricants, and adhesives.  Outgassing increases with 
increases in temperature.   In addition, the sun releases highly-energetic particles into the 
space environment during solar flares and coronal mass ejections (CMEs) which can 
result in surface charging.   Solar flares are violent explosions in the Sun’s atmosphere 
which causes a surge of high-energy particles to be released resulting in a proton storm.  
A CME involves the Sun ejecting a plasma from the solar corona.  The plasma consists of 
mainly electrons and protons.   
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The low-power signals coming from satellite antennas, like any RF transmission 
(including those being sent to the satellite), can be jammed.  Jamming involves 
intentionally masking a target signal with another RF signal.  The signals coming from 
the satellite can be jammed using very little jamming power.  Jamming can result in 
signal degradation or total signal loss [23, 27].  Please refer to Section 2.6 for several 
examples of satellite jamming events that have occurred in the past.   
 Spoofing involves intentionally transmitting false information to the COMSAT in 
order to “deceive or computationally overwhelm” the satellite, thereby overriding the 
intended signal [27].  The objective of spoofing is to send the receiver a malicious signal 
that overpowers the intended signal, fooling the receiver into using a false signal for 
further processing.   The composite signal received at the antenna is that of the intended 
signal plus the spoofed signal plus the signal noise.  Spoofing is only possible on 
satellites with on-board processing capabilities, because it is at the analog-to-digital (A/D) 
conversion stage that the spoofed signal overrides the intended signal.  Most on-board 
processing satellite receivers have automatic gain control which is important for a 
spoofing attack to be successful (See Figure 19.).  Spoofing is more serious than jamming, 
because the attacker can take control of the receiver with spoofing, while in the case of 
jamming the attacker only causes signal degradation [15]. 
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Figure 19.  Spoofing Vulnerability Illustration [15] 
 
 
Satellite side lobe energy can be received (via a high gain antenna) by an 
unintended target and retransmitted.  This is termed meaconing.  Meaconing causes the 
signal to be delayed in reaching its target.  Should a disgruntled employee obtain access 
to the satellite and its antennas before launch, the employee could connect a delay device 
(such as a wideband analog-to-digital or digital-to-analog converter or a digital delay line) 
to the antenna.  This would be somewhat easier than trying to capture the satellite signal, 
however the likelihood of no one noticing the delay device prior to launch is very low.  
The delay device attack is more likely to take place at an Earth station [27]. 
 Intentional physical attack of a satellite became a very real possibility as the U.S. 
watched China’s first successful anti-satellite missile test take place in January 2007.  On 
11 January 2007, a ground-based missile destroyed an obsolete Chinese weather satellite.  
According to senior U.S. officials, in 2006 China tried to “blind American satellites” with 
lasers.  These types of attacks are feasible for low Earth orbit (LEO) satellites, but 
medium Earth orbits (MEO) and GEO orbits are likely out of range.  As these attack 
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technologies advance in the years to come, the capability to physically damage an in-orbit 
COMSAT and knock out critical communications components becomes closer to reality 
[114]. 
 
4.2.2 Transponder Vulnerabilities 
If an attacker’s signal is sent to a bent-pipe transponder from the satellite’s 
antenna and the signal is at the correct carrier frequency, it will be processed along with 
the intended signals and re-transmitted along with them down to the receiver.  The 
attacker’s signal may obscure the intended signal at the receiver if it has a great enough 
signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) making the receiver unable to discern the intended signal 
from the attacker’s signal.  In addition, the attacker’s signal raises the noise floor (i.e. the 
background noise) of the transponder and causes a reduction in the SNR of all of the 
intended signals.  If an intended signal gets lost in the background noise, it cannot be 
recovered [118, 130].  
Typically attackers will utilize a narrowband, high SNR, un-modulated carrier 
because these types of carriers can have a greater SNR than modulated carriers.  By using 
an un-modulated carrier, the attacker achieves the raised noise floor of the intended signal.  
Therefore, the attacker’s signal will degrade or completely cut-off communications 
across the transponder [130].   
 In order to carry multiple signals on a single carrier frequency (i.e. a single 
transponder) and more efficiently utilize the limited bandwidth available, differing 
polarizations are used.  Polarization is a property of electromagnetic (EM) waves which 
describes the orientation of the oscillations in the plane perpendicular to the direction in 
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which the EM wave is travelling.  Linear polarization consists of either vertical or 
horizontal polarizations which are used in conjunction with each other on a single carrier 
frequency to differentiate between signals.  Circular polarization consists of either right-
handed circular or left-handed circular polarizations depending on which way the EM 
wave oscillates about the perpendicular plane.  Right-handed and left-handed circular 
polarizations can also be used to differentiate between signals on the same carrier 
frequency.  If an attacker transmits to the satellite with an improper polarization setting 
(i.e. when the attacker’s polarization does not exactly match the polarization being 
accepted by the satellite antenna feed horn, the result is excess power creeping onto the 
other polarization which is likely being used by a legitimate customer.  This effect is 
called cross-polarization, and it can result in interference with the legitimate customer’s 
signal (which is using the opposite polarization on the same transponder) [130]. 
As mentioned in Section 3.2.2, multiple access schemes are also utilized to enable 
each transponder to carry multiple signals.  CDMA is used for secure communications 
because it offers protection against frequency jamming and co-channel interference.  Co-
channel interference is interference from other signals using the same frequency channel.  
However, if the intended signal’s modulation, frequency, and code are known, jammers 
can concentrate all their power at that particular frequency to corrupt the intended signal.  
If the jammer transmits at a power high enough to compensate for the CDMA jamming 
resistance advantage, the jammer could interfere with the intended signal [62, 124].  
TDMA avoids interference between user signals by strictly following timeslot schedules.   
As discussed in Section 2.4.1, FDMA is susceptible to intermodulation (IM) products.  
IM products can cause interference and noise, as well as reduce the power output of the 
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satellite that is available for communications.  Also, FDMA is vulnerable to co-channel 
interference if the channel spacing is not sufficient [62]. 
Satellites may use spread spectrum which is intended to increase resistance to 
jamming by spreading the signal out by way of a spreading code (for example, a unique 
pseudorandom number sequence).  Because the signal is spread across a wide bandwidth, 
spread spectrum is able to lessen multipath signal fading and interference.  The spreading 
code is typically protected via encryption.  Only users with the encryption key can obtain 
the spreading code which enables them to de-spread the signal.  If an attacker gains 
access to the signal’s spreading code, the attacker could spoof other users of the signal 
[62, 128]. 
 If linear feedback shift registers (LFSR) are used to create the spreading 
sequences for spread spectrum (codes for CDMA) and the pseudorandom number 
generator (PRNG) seed (or start) values are known, jamming of a spread spectrum or 
CDMA signal becomes relatively easy.  The PRNG seed values are the key to the PRNGs 
and can be obtained through cryptanalysis or theft [49]. 
 
4.2.3 TWTA Vulnerabilities 
As was mentioned previously in Section 3.2.3, TWTAs are susceptible to high 
voltage breakdown failures that can result in spurious emissions and TWT failure.  
Spurious emissions are unintentionally created RF signals which could interfere with the 
intended signal.  This high voltage breakdown in the TWTA is referred to as multipaction, 
or high voltage breakdown in a vacuum.  Multipaction is generally a product of the 
transmitted frequency and electrode separation [41].  Multipaction occurs typically in 
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vacuum environments, such as that inside a TWTA. Charged particles inside the gap 
between the TWT electrodes oscillate due to a strong, external electric field.  RF energy, 
such as that of the signal being passed through the TWTA, puts stress on these charged 
particles.  Every time the particles hit the walls of the gap other charged particles are 
released.  More and more charged particles are released as more and more of them hit the 
walls of the gap eventually creating enough charged particles to cause a spark which can 
cause hardware damage [76, 113]. 
 
4.2.4 Satellite Access Router Vulnerabilities 
The on-board access router communicates with and is commanded by the 
satellite’s on-board computer.  The two devices are connected via the router’s console 
interface.  The satellite’s on-board computer operates all the other spacecraft mechanisms 
as well.  Almost all current computing systems utilize digital technology which is 
vulnerable to interference from ionic disturbances and radiation, for example.  Exposure 
to these elements of the space environment could result in malfunctions of the on-board 
computer and thus the satellite systems that it commands [20].  In fact, many times space 
system on-board computers use older technology and older software.  These systems are 
operating in orbit for ten to fifteen years.  By the time they are mission-ended, the on-
board computing capabilities are out-dated.  In April 2008, hackers are thought to have 
loaded a Trojan horse in the computers at Johnson Space Center in Houston, Texas.  
These hackers then used the Trojan horse to access the uplink to the International Space 
Station (ISS) and disrupt certain operations on-board, such as email.  The attack was 
helped by the fact that ISS on-board computers are running older software for which 
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security fixes are no longer available.  If this is true, and such an attack can be executed 
against the ISS, all earth-orbiting satellites may be at risk.  If a hacker could gain access 
to the satellite Earth station to plant a virus on the Earth station’s computers, then the 
hackers could access the satellite and impede or disrupt communications across the 
satellite [75].  In addition, bugs in on-board software in both the on-board computer and 
on-board access router could render one or both of these components unable to complete 
their respective missions.   
 In reference to the IRIS payload that is planned to be carried on-board 
INTELSAT 14 that has been discussed in previous examples, its use of Internet protocol 
(IP) packet routing may cause the satellite to be susceptible to all of the vulnerabilities of 
IP packet routing [106].  IP packet routing was intended to make routing as easy as 
possible.  A packet routed with IP could be accessed, re-routed, or copied by anyone 
connected to the network [112].  IP networks are susceptible to spoofing, sniffing, and 
session hijacking.  Spoofing indicates that an attacker’s machine on the network can 
impersonate as another legitimate user’s machine.  Sniffing involves an attacker listening 
in on communications between other legitimate users.  An attack in which the attacker 
uses spoofing to take over an existing communications session and acts as one of the 
former communicating parties is termed session hijacking [11]. 
 
4.2.5 Space Segment Vulnerabilities Summary 
Of the satellite access points, the antennas are the outermost, and thus are the 
most vulnerable to attack.  All signals must pass through the antennas first before being 
passed to the other satellite access point components.  Therefore, the satellite antenna will 
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be the first component compromised before attacks can be placed against any of the other 
components such as the transponders, TWTAs, or on-board access router.   
 
4.3 Earth Segment Vulnerabilities 
 
 
As mentioned in Section 3.3, the Earth stations interface between the satellites 
and the terrestrial networks via their own antennas on the ground.   The Earth stations 
serve as central hubs for VSAT networks, and they are connected to a network of other 
Earth stations and the Network Operations Center (NOC) via the satellite.  User terminals 
access the Earth station network via network access points (NAPs).   These access points 
and connections not only serve to provide satellite communications services across the 
globe, but they also make the Earth station network vulnerable to attack.   
The NOC controls the network of user terminals.  It provides a web-based 
interface for users, a connection to the terrestrial fiber network, and controls access to 
services with the help of the NOC access router.  In the case of the IRIS payload, the 
satellite on-board access router carries the responsibility for controlling access to services.  
Since the NOC has additional functions on top of those of a typical Earth station, there 
are other supplementary vulnerabilities that could make the NOC susceptible to attack.   
 
4.3.1 Earth Station Antenna Vulnerabilities 
Earth station antennas are susceptible to some of the same vulnerabilities as the 
satellite antennas, such as RF jamming, interference (co-channel, IM product, and 
antenna side lobe), multipath, environmental conditions, and deliberate attack.  However, 
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since these antennas are located on the ground, there are also different vulnerabilities 
associated with these systems.   
 Like satellite antennas, Earth station antennas are susceptible to damage due to 
environmental conditions.  However, the differences in the Earth and space environments 
bring about different types of vulnerabilities in Earth station antennas.  Since Earth 
station antennas need to have a clear view of the on-orbit satellites, many times they are 
located on rooftops.  This particular location makes these antennas susceptible to damage 
or destruction by extremely strong winds.  If antennas are located in regions that are 
prone to storms involving high winds, such as hurricanes or tornadoes, placing them on 
building rooftops might not be ideal.   
 Since Earth station antennas protrude from buildings in order that they can be 
keep the satellites in view, they are also the most visible and thus the most vulnerable 
components of Earth stations to physical attack.  The only weapon an attacker would 
need to damage or destroy an Earth station antenna would be a high-powered rifle.  Most 
metal parabolic dish antennas can withstand a number of bullet impacts before any 
degradation in performance occurs.  However, fiberglass antennas are more vulnerable to 
bullets.  They will begin to break with the first bullet impact, causing degradation in 
performance right away.  If the attackers knows to instead attack the antenna’s feed horn, 
just a few rounds of bullets could knock out communications across any antenna.  
Located at the focal point of the antenna dish (reflector), the feed horn transmits RF 
signals between the transmitter/receiver and the reflector.  The feed horn selects the 
polarization of the received signal and helps to attenuate co-channel interference.  In 
addition, Earth station antennas could also be vulnerable to vehicle collisions.  If an 
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attacker can gain access to the Earth station facility, they could easily just run their 
vehicle into a ground-mounted Earth station antenna, causing damage and possibly 
knocking out communications [32]. 
 If an attacker is able to gain control of the telemetry, tracking, and control (TT&C) 
link from the operator on the ground to the satellite, there are several possible attacks that 
could take place and may result in loss of control of the satellite.  For example, if 
multiple Earth stations were used to send a series of tones to a satellite transponder and 
then observe the differences in phase of the signals returning from the satellite, the 
spoofer could transmit false responses to the satellite to cause incorrect orbit 
determination.  Also, the attacker could send commands to the satellite via this link or 
record commands from the TT&C station to be replayed later and cause duplicate actions 
to take place on-board the satellite.  Since spare satellites are not always tracked by 
TT&C, these satellites are vulnerable to takeover.  Then the attacker could move or use 
them as they like [155]. 
 In addition to antenna side lobe interference from nearby Earth stations, as 
discussed previously in relation to satellite antennas, other forms of terrestrial 
interference can cause degradation in the Earth station communications signal.  This 
interference can come from such devices as radars or radar altimeters which emit pulsed 
signals.  This type of interference can cause symbol errors in the intended signal.  When 
there exists a long series of consecutive symbol errors, the result may be receiver failure.  
Long-pulse-width interference causes many consecutive symbol errors.   As the number 
of consecutive errors increases, the sensitivity of the antenna system to interference 
increases [133].  Electromagnetic pulse (EMP) energy, such as that emitted during a 
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nuclear detonation, is also an interference concern.  EMP has far-reaching effects.  It can 
cause performance degradation up to 6,000 kilometers from the detonation site.  EMPs 
are roughly 1,000 times more intense than radar pulses and are capable of temporarily 
halting communications [65].  EMP could even cause interference to a satellite antenna 
should a nuclear weapon be launched and detonated in space.  The weapon does not 
necessarily have to impact the satellite to cause damage to communications.  The EMP 
energy could degrade performance on any nearby satellites.   
Earth station antenna interference can also come from terrestrial sources such as 
radio towers, as illustrated in Figure 15.  A radio broadcast can enter the Earth station 
antenna system at the intermediate frequency (IF) level of the Earth station due to a bad 
connection between the Earth station baseband equipment (such as modems and 
multiplexers) and the Earth station RF equipment (such as low noise amplifiers (LNAs) 
and TWTAs) (See Figure 20.).  The radio broadcast would then be transmitted to the 
satellite, causing interference with the intended signal.   
 
 
Figure 20.  Radio Frequency Interference Illustration [135] 
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4.3.2 VSAT Central Hub Vulnerabilities 
An important part of an Earth station’s mission as a VSAT central hub is ensuring 
that user terminals connecting to the Earth station network are authorized users.  
Bandwidth is typically dynamically allocated to user terminals in TDMA VSAT 
networks (for example, mesh networks).  As a result of this dynamic allocation, control 
data must be sent to each of the user terminals requesting bandwidth.  This control 
information can be exploited by attackers.  If the attacker can obtain a VSAT terminal 
and spoof the device ID, the attacker can then insert the rogue device into the network 
[86]. 
 In the case of a star topology VSAT network (refer to Section 2.3.9 for details), 
the VSAT central hub is a single point of failure.  The central hub acts as a control center 
and traffic gateway for all of the VSATs that are connected to it.  Since the central hub is 
the only connection these VSATs have to the rest of the Earth station network, if the 
central hub is somehow compromised, then the network of VSATs connected to it will 
lose communications.  On the other hand, mesh topology VSAT networks do not have 
this single point of failure vulnerability because mesh networks have a way of ensuring 
messages reach their destination despite any node failures.  If an intermediate node along 
the route to the message’s final destination node has failed, the mesh VSAT network is 
capable of re-routing the message along an alternative route to ensure message delivery 
[159]. 
 VSAT networks are also vulnerable to eavesdropping.  If an attacker with an 
understanding of data link layer protocols purchases a VSAT user terminal, the attacker 
can eavesdrop data intended for other legitimate users.  In order to listen in on data 
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intended for others, the attacker must tune the terminal to the correct frequency (and 
timeslot in the case of TDMA networks) and “reverse engineer the VSAT’s embedded 
code” [152].  Eavesdropping can result in the compromise of passwords and other secret 
information.   
 Due to the burst-like nature of VSAT data, fixed-assignment multiple access 
schemes such as FDMA and TDMA are not typically utilized because they do not 
provide efficient bandwidth utilization in this situation.  Therefore, some VSAT terminals 
employ random access protocols, such as Aloha and its variations (Refer to Section 2.3.9 
for more details on the Aloha random access protocols).  The Aloha protocols rely on 
each VSAT terminal being able to “hear” its own transmissions, and therefore these 
protocols are not used in VSAT star topology networks.  VSATs in star networks cannot 
hear their own transmissions due to the differing bit rates used to transfer data on the 
inbound versus the outbound carriers [74].  Since the Aloha protocol allows any user to 
transmit at any time, there is a vulnerability to loss of packets due to collisions with other 
users’ packets.  The probability of packet collision is proportional to the traffic (or the 
duty cycle which is the fraction of time that the channel is active) [3].  Due to the fact that 
the Aloha protocols are contention-based, they may be unstable during periods of high-
traffic loads.  When a channel becomes unstable, an increased number of packets are sent 
due to retransmissions and the number of successfully delivered messages diminishes 
[74]. 
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4.3.3 Earth Station Network Vulnerabilities 
The Earth station network is vulnerable to the same vulnerabilities as each 
individual Earth station, including all of the Earth station antenna vulnerabilities.  The 
Earth station network is susceptible to natural disasters, as well as intentional attacks, like 
each Earth station.  Continuing with the example of the INTELSAT 14 satellite (which is 
planned to carry the IRIS payload), the details of the INTELSAT Earth station network 
and network vulnerabilities will be presented.   
 INTELSAT owns and leases thirteen Earth stations across the globe in the 
following locations:  Ellenwood, GA; Napa, CA; Fillmore, CA; Hagerstown, MD; Castle 
Rock, CO; Paumalu, HI; Riverside,CA; Fuchsstadt, Germany; Clarksburg, MD; Kumsan, 
South Korea; Fucino, Italy; Perth, Australia; and Pretoria, South Africa.  The Ellenwood, 
GA (i.e. the Atlanta Teleport) Earth station is the primary Atlantic Ocean Region (AOR) 
gateway for INTELSAT.  This will likely be the Earth station used by INTELSAT 14, as 
it will be located in the AOR and this is the same Earth station used by IS-1R.  
INTELSAT 14 will be replacing IS-1R in its same orbital location.  Figure 21 is a general 
overview of an INTELSAT Earth station configuration.   
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Figure 21.  INTELSAT Earth Station Configuration Overview [87] 
 
From Figure 21, it is important to focus on the main components, such as the access 
routers and the connection to the Internet backbone.  These components will be discussed 
in a later section on the NOC.  However, they are important components to consider in 
this vulnerability analysis.   
INTELSAT’s Earth station network utilizes secure shell (SSH) and IP security 
(IPsec) for securing communications [87].   However, SSH has several vulnerabilities 
associated with it that could allow an attack on the network.  A malformed protocol 
message can cause buffer overflows or denial of service (DoS) in the firewalls and virtual 
private networks (VPNs) that are shown in Figure 21.  If a VPN is compromised, the 
attacker could then gain access to the protected Earth station network [40].  Buffer 
overflows involve “data fields overflowing and overwriting memory segments for 
executable code,” resulting in an attacker being able to remotely control the VPNs.  
Denial of service attacks prevent systems from performing routine operations by flooding 
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the systems (VPNs or firewalls) with control messages that can cause them to become 
overloaded [49].   
 
4.3.4 Network Access Point Vulnerabilities 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, network access points connect SSPs and 
user terminals to the Earth station network via wireless network adapters or fiber 
connections.  A NAP must determine its location and send that information (i.e. its IP 
address) to a connecting user terminal.  In doing so, the NAP along with the rest of the 
network becomes vulnerable to attack.  The NAP location information sent to the 
connecting user may be intercepted by an attacker who could then use this information to 
set up a rogue access point.  If an attacker is able to intercept the IP address of the NAP, 
then the attacker can send false address resolution protocol (ARP) responses that include 
the IP address of the (legitimate) NAP and the media access control (MAC) address of 
the attacker’s rogue device to other legitimate user terminals connected to the network.  
This will result in the legitimate users updating their ARP tables with the mapping to the 
rogue access point (in place of the mapping to the legitimate NAP).  All future data 
packets sent from these legitimate users will now go to the attacker’s rogue access point 
and allow the attacker access to sensitive data and an possibly even an access to corporate 
networks from outside the facilities [67].  This access to corporate networks would 
require the attacker to install the rogue access point (AP) directly at an active network 
port inside the company facility; however passing through physical security at most 
companies is not very difficult [69].   
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4.3.5 Wireless Network Adapter Vulnerabilities 
During normal operations, wireless network adapters (WNAs) receive data 
packets indicating new networks are present.  If an attacker can gain access to these data 
packets and manipulate them, the attacker can trigger an error condition which could 
allow the attacker to run programs and access files on the targeted user terminal [53].  
Whenever a WNA is active, the user terminal’s operating system automatically will look 
for networks the user has connected to in the past.  A user terminal could end up 
connecting to an attacker’s network without even knowing it.  “Suppose the attacker 
provides a rogue AP with a common name (such as a default service set identifier (SSID) 
of a popular home-office AP, like Linksys)” [139].  Then, a nearby user, who has 
connected to a similarly-named AP in the past, may mistake the rogue AP for the 
legitimate, similarly-named AP.  This could allow an attacker access to sensitive user 
data [139].  In the case that a user terminal is already connected to a network, an attacker 
can force the user to start searching again for available networks by spoofing IEEE 
802.11 disassociation frames from the NAP to which the user is already connected.  IEEE 
802.11 is a set of standards for wireless local area network computer communication.  A 
disassociation frame is sent to a user if the AP wishes to terminate the user’s connection.  
Upon receiving these disassociation frames, the user terminal would disconnect from the 
NAP and start searching for other available nearby networks.  The only piece of 
information the attacker would need to spoof the 802.11 disassociation frames from the 
NAP is the IP address of the NAP.  The NAP’s IP address can easily be obtained from 
the beacon frames the NAP is required to transmit continuously.   The 802.11 beacon 
frames are management frames that allow user terminals to establish and maintain 
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communications by identifying the presence of APs.  The user’s search for other 
available nearby (unencrypted) networks will likely resulting in the user joining the 
attacker’s AP [50].   
 
4.3.6 NOC Internet Connection Vulnerabilities 
The NOC web-based user interface implies a connection to the Internet backbone.  
The NOC can be connected to an Internet backbone provider via a fiber connection.  
There are several vulnerabilities associated with fiber connections, such as physical 
vulnerabilities to breakage and vulnerability to the fibers being cut by attackers.   
 The NOC’s Internet connection allows user terminals to access network services 
remotely.  Unfortunately, Internet connections are susceptible to a variety of attacks, such 
as:  spyware, phishing attempts, viruses, backdoors, Trojan horses, and worms, all of 
which could try to slip into the Earth station network through the NOC Internet 
connection [109].  Spyware is computer software that is installed on a user’s terminal (or 
the network) without the user’s (or network’s) knowledge.  Spyware can collect user 
information, install unwanted software, change computer settings, and cause Internet 
connection problems among other things [148].  Phishing attempts are made to obtain 
sensitive information.  This information is acquired by the attacker pretending to be a 
known or trusted source in order to fool the user (or the network) into sending sensitive 
information.  A computer virus, like spyware, infects a user terminal (or network) without 
the user’s (or network’s) knowledge.  A computer virus is capable of copying itself and 
spreading from one terminal to another.  Computer viruses can delete files, damage 
programs, take up computer memory, cause erratic behavior, and even cause the system 
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to crash [46].  Backdoors can be put in software either during design or via a virus and 
allow the attacker to gain access or even take control over systems.  A Trojan horse can 
cause just as much damage as viruses, but they do not copy themselves.  A Trojan horse 
acts as if it is a legitimate program when really it is a destructive one.  For instance, a 
Trojan horse can fool users into believing that it is anti-virus software when in fact it 
actually installs viruses onto the user’s terminal.  Worms, like viruses, are able to copy 
themselves and spread the copies to other user terminals without the user’s knowledge.  
Viruses and worms differ in that worms do not attach themselves to existing programs.  
Also, worms generally harm the network by using up bandwidth, while viruses typically 
corrupt or modify files on user terminals [46, 47]. 
 
4.3.7 NOC Connection to Terrestrial Fiber Network Vulnerabilities 
The NOC connection to the terrestrial fiber network has all of the vulnerabilities 
associated with the fiber connection that were discussed in the previous section.  In 
addition, since the NOC connection to the terrestrial fiber network provides user 
terminals and Earth stations access to the Internet or to private Intranets, this connection 
is susceptible to all of the vulnerabilities associated with Intranet and Internet access.   
 There are over 5,000 known vulnerabilities to Internet connections and more are 
added every day [129].  Some of these vulnerabilities were discussed in the previous 
section.  In addition, there are variations on the vulnerabilities mentioned in the previous 
section, as well as operating system specific vulnerabilities.  The important thing to 
remember is that Internet connections present a multitude of vulnerabilities, because the 
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Internet interconnects people from all across the world, giving access to those that might 
be trying to attack U.S. satellite systems.   
 Since Intranets are private corporate networks and not open to everyone, 
connections to Intranets are subject to a different set of vulnerabilities than Internet 
connections.  For instance, Intranets could be subject to cross-site request forgery (CSRF) 
attacks and cross-site scripting (XSS) attacks.  During a CSRF attack, “the attacker fools 
the user into loading a web page that contains a malicious request.  The attacker then tries 
to steal victims’ identities and privileges to carry out activities such as changing their 
passwords to gain entrance to Intranets.  Attackers can essentially access prior web 
browser sessions and remain logged into any sites that have been accessed by the user to 
carry out illicit activities” [80].  On the other hand, during XSS attacks, attackers set up a 
malicious webpage to masquerade as a trustworthy website, one that likely will not be 
blocked from the company network.  This type of attack can lead to session hijacking and 
user impersonation, worms, viruses, phishing attacks, and Trojan horses, just to name a 
few [73, 80].  If VPNs are offered to allow employees in remote locations to connect to 
the company Intranet, the vulnerabilities associated with VPNs may offer another entry 
point for attackers to gain access to the private Intranet [80].  These VPN vulnerabilities 
will be discussed in the following section.  Also, there is a susceptibility to domain name 
system (DNS) rebinding attacks in Java which can allow an attacker to bypass the 
perimeter firewall and gain access to a corporate Internet.  DNS rebinding involves an 
attack on code embedded in web pages, such as Java or JavaScript.  DNS rebinding 
improves the ability of Java (or JavaScript) to infiltrate private Intranets.  First, the 
attacker must register a domain, which is then added to the DNS server controlled by the 
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attacker.  The DNS server responds with time to live (TTL) parameter sets.  The first 
server response has the IP address of the server with the malicious code.  The next set of 
responses will contain IP addresses from targeted private Intranets.  By iterating, the 
attacker is able to scan the Intranet or perform other malicious acts [56, 93].  This is just 
one example of the vulnerabilities associated with different coding languages being 
embedded inside one another.  This occurs frequently with web pages, hypertext markup 
language (HTML) typically used for web pages is often times embedded with Java, 
JavaScript, or Adobe Flash.  Flash is used to create animations and incorporate video in 
web pages.  Java is a programming language used to include the capability of running 
secure Java applets in web pages. JavaScript is a scripting language used in web pages 
[94].   
 
4.3.8 NOC Access Router Vulnerabilities 
As mentioned in Section 3.4.1, the NOC access router enables the NOC manager 
to allow or deny users access to satellite services.  Flaws in this router could allow an 
attacker to prevent traffic from entering or leaving the NOC and to interrupt services.  
Within routers there are several buffers, including the output buffer which is important 
for packet switching.  Due to the fact that buffer size is finite, routers are susceptible to 
buffer overflow attacks.  Since the output buffer can cause queuing delays and packet 
loss when it is completely filled, if an attacker continually sends many packets to the 
router, they are capable of causing a buffer overflow resulting loss of data packets [22].  
The NOC access router may also be susceptible to the same IP packet routing 
vulnerabilities as discussed in relation to the IRIS satellite access router in Section 4.2.4.   
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 In terms of routing protocols, there are several options that can be used for packet 
routing.  The Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) is the main routing protocol used for the 
Internet.  It works by keeping up-to-date a routing table of the autonomous systems that 
are crossed in reaching the destination.  An autonomous system is a collection of IP 
networks and routers that are controlled by one entity and use a common routing protocol.  
BGP is a path vector protocol, which means that the path that routing table updates take 
as they are sent across the network are maintained in order that the current network 
topology is known to each router and is updated in all routing tables across the network.  
BGP Version 4 has been in use since 1994 [26].  Routing Information Protocol (RIP) and 
Enhanced Interior Gateway Routing Protocol (EIGRP) are both examples of distance 
vector routing protocols which use the Bellman-Ford algorithm for determining routing 
paths by calculating the direction and distance to any node in the network.  Routers using 
these protocols must inform neighboring routers of network topology changes 
periodically, so that routing tables can be updated.  EIGRP is a Cisco proprietary routing 
protocol.  It minimizes routing instabilities after network topology changes [59].  RIP 
enables routers to adapt to a continually changing network topology by sending 
information about which networks are reachable by each router and about the distance to 
each of those networks from the routers.  Open Shortest Path First (OSPF) and 
Intermediate system to intermediate system (IS-IS) link state routing protocols are now 
preferred over RIP [132].  Link state routing protocols also send network topology 
information across the network, upon which each routing updates its routing tables to 
maintain clear picture of the current network state.  Packets are sent via the best path 
through the network to the destination which is determined by Dijkstra’s Shortest Path 
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algorithm.  OSPF does error detection and correction on its own, avoiding the use of 
either transmission control protocol (TCP) or user datagram protocol (UDP).  OSPF is 
generally used in large corporate networks [120].  IS-IS, on the other hand, is typically 
used in large service provider networks because it can support more routers than OSPF.  
IS-IS does not use IP for transporting routing information [92].   
 The BGP routing protocol has several vulnerabilities associated with it, to include:  
de-aggregation attacks, unauthorized route injection, bogon (or Martian) routes, and 
Distributed DoS (DDoS) attacks [134].  A de-aggregation attack consists of a mis-
configured router flooding the network with BGP routes which caused routing to be 
disrupted globally and many routers to crash.  The whole network could experience 
connectivity issues.  Bogon routes are unused or not-widely-publicized routes, typically 
for private use.  These routes can be hijacked and actively advertised making it possible 
for an attacker to redirect traffic to their router instead of the intended destination.  In 
order to intercept the traffic, the attacker can use a de-aggregation type attack and try to 
manipulate the path to their router so that it appears shorter than the path to the legitimate 
router.  This form of attack can allow traffic eavesdropping or cause DoS [18].  DDoS 
attacks involve infecting a multitude of user terminals with viruses that all attack at the 
same time [49].   
 Cisco’s EIGRP is susceptible to ARP DoS attacks as well as Directed DoS attacks.  
The ARP DoS attack is accomplished by sending spoofed EIGRP announcements.  The 
announcements will result in an ARP storm which will take up network capacity while 
routers try to contact the announcing router.  The Directed DoS attack is possible by 
sending forged packets into the network which could cause routers to change their 
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routing neighbor relationships.  Iterating this attack could cause sustained DoS.  Also, if 
the attacker is inside the network, the attacker may be able to divert and modify messages 
before returning them to the traffic flow [38].   
 The RIP protocols can enable an attacker to inject routes into the network and 
allows the disclosure of routing information [70].  Since RIP has no built-in 
authentication, an attacker can masquerade as a legitimate user by causing traffic 
intended for the legitimate user to be sent to the attacker instead.  As is in the case with 
BGP bogon route attacks, an attacker can send false RIP packets announcing the 
attacker’s route is the shortest causing subsequent data packets sent out in the network to 
be routed through the attacker’s router.  The data packets could then be viewed and 
modified [115].   
 OSPF is also susceptible to DoS attacks.  These DoS vulnerabilities can stop 
traffic from entering a victim’s router [153].  If an attacker is able to change the value of 
the “age field” in a legitimate router’s link state advertisement (LSA) to “MaxAge”, then 
the attacker could interrupt routing through that legitimate user’s router.  The LSA 
contains the routing information for the particular router disseminating it.   MaxAge is 
used to eliminate old LSA’s from the distributed database.  By changing the age field to 
almost the MaxAge, the LSA would age prematurely causing it to be deleted from the 
database prematurely.  If two LSA ages are within a “MaxAgeDiff” window, OSPF will 
call them equal.  The false LSA could replace the legitimate LSA and cause it to be 
eliminated prematurely from the database.  This would only happen if the legitimate LSA 
was also in the MaxAgeDiff window.  MaxAgeDiff is defined as one quarter of MaxAge 
and one half of the normal refresh interval.  There is no way to protect against routers in 
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the network announcing false information about their own links, such as announcing a 
connection that does not exist.  These false announcements could result in this internal 
router receiving data packets that are bound for the network to which it announces the 
false connection.  The packets would not reach their destination, unless the router passed 
on the data packets to their correct destination network [19].   
 IS-IS is widely used by network operators due to the fact that it runs over open 
systems interconnection (OSI) Layer 2 (Data Link layer) protocols and disturbances on 
the IP Layer (Network layer, Layer 3).  Attacks like DDoS attacks do not have an effect 
on IS-IS [7].  Data link layer protocols include PPP and LAPB.   
 In summary, routing protocols were not designed to protect against insertion and 
propagation of false routing information.  The capability exists for attackers to modify, 
delete, replay, or generate false routing information and send it propagating through the 
network.  If an attacker announces that their route is the shortest route to many networks, 
they can cause congestion and increase the load on the network.  Also, by injecting 
incorrect routing information into the network, an attacker can make areas of the network 
seem unreachable, when in fact they are actually reachable.  Also, a router internal to the 
network could send incorrect routing information about its own links to the rest of the 
network [19].  The least vulnerable of the routing protocols mentioned in this section 
seems to be IS-IS.     
 Since the NOC access router allows (or denies) access to satellite services, the 
vulnerabilities associated with those particular services also need to be taken into 
consideration.  These service vulnerabilities will be discussed in a later section on the 
SSP.  Since there are a multitude of services that are currently available via satellite, the 
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example of INTELSAT 14 will be continued in the discussion of service vulnerabilities, 
and only the vulnerabilities associated with the services to be offered by INTELSAT 14 
and the IRIS payload will be discussed.   
 
4.3.9 Earth Segment Vulnerabilities Summary 
The Earth station network is the most vulnerable component of the satellite 
system’s Earth segment.  It incorporates all of the vulnerabilities of each Earth station 
that is part of the network.  In addition, since the NOC is also a part of the Earth station 
network, the Earth station network is subject to all NOC vulnerabilities, as well.   
 
4.4 User Segment Vulnerabilities 
 
 
As mentioned in Section 3.5, the user segment consists of user stations that enable 
access to corporate Intranets, the Internet, and cellular networks.  Remote users can 
connect via the Internet to an SSP to access services.  Points of Presence (PoPs) may act 
as the “middle man” in providing remote users Internet access via ISPs.  Standard PC 
devices are also an option for remote users in the case where access to the terrestrial fiber 
network is impossible.  All of these accesses to various satellite services make the user 
segment susceptible to a variety of attacks.  Also, connections via SSPs, PoPs, and 
standard PC devices may have additional vulnerabilities associated with them.  The 
vulnerabilities associated with Internet and Intranet access were discussed previously in 
Section 4.3.7 and will not be repeated here.   
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4.4.1 Cellular Network Access Vulnerabilities 
Many of the vulnerabilities associated with cellular network access are due to the 
interaction between these cellular networks and the Internet.  If these attacks target user 
terminals, as opposed to the cellular network, they are usually harder for the network 
operators to defend against.  An example of one particular attack involves attackers 
exploiting multimedia messaging service (MMS) vulnerabilities in order to drain user 
terminal batteries.  The attack was executed by first creating a list of target user terminals 
with active Internet connections.  This list was compiled by exploiting the insecurities of 
the MMS protocol.  Once the target list was created, the attackers could drain the 
terminals’ batteries faster than normal by exploiting the packet data protocol (PDP) 
context retention.  Before a user terminal can use any general packet radio services 
(GPRSs), the terminal must be registered with a Serving GPRS Support Node (SGSN).  
A PDP context is created during this registration procedure.  Upon ending a 
communication session, the terminal would go into standby mode; however the PDP 
context is still allocated to the terminal.  This is done to keep from having to deactivate 
and reactivate a new PDP context after ending every communication.  Deactivating and 
reactivating a new PDP context could cause applications to restart and require the user to 
re-enter all passwords.  Since user cellular terminals will accept any MMS message it 
receives as long as the message format is correct, an attacker can send as many MMS 
messages to the terminal as they want without alarming the cellular services provider.  
Phones reveal information such as:  hardware description, display capabilities, and the 
current and compatible software whenever they communication over HTTP.  An attacker 
could easily obtain the terminal model number from this information.  In order to build 
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the target list, the attacker sends an MMS message with their web server location to the 
target terminals, and then waits for HTTP request messages from the terminals to come to 
their web server.  Since most cellular terminals download MMS messages automatically 
upon receipt, the terminals will automatically make HTTP requests, which usually 
contain the profiles and IP addresses of the terminals, to the attacker’s web server.   Also, 
the terminal’s reply to the attacker’s MMS message activates a PDP context, making the 
battery draining attack easy to execute.  The active PDP enables the attacker to send 
extraneous IP packets to the target user terminals to drain their batteries.  Since cellular 
terminals are usually in standby mode, when a message is received a page on the paging 
channel will bring the terminal to the ready state and cause it to perform a location update.  
This process causes the terminal to use up battery power [35].   
 Cellular networks themselves are susceptible to various attacks, including:  
worms, eavesdropping, spamming, masquerade attacks (impersonating users and 
networks), DoS, man-in-the-middle attacks, and hijacking of services.  An attacker could 
sending a multitude of messages to many target user terminals in one area and cause DoS 
in that area of the network by saturating network control channels which are used for 
both voice and short message service (SMS) services.  Since cellular network providers 
allow email and web-based interfaces to message user terminals directly, a spam attack 
combined with a phishing attack could allow an attacker to gain access to users’ sensitive 
data.  Worms can also be used to attack a cellular network.  They can be spread via email 
attachments or Bluetooth.  Worms can cause DoS attacks or change user terminal 
operating systems and then search for other terminals to infect, for example.  By 
changing the terminal’s operating system, the attacker could drain the terminal’s battery 
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by setting the terminal’s transceiver to run continuously at maximum strength [35].  An 
attacker can gain entry into the cellular network by exploiting a buffer overflow 
vulnerability in dual-mode cellular terminals which enable users to access both cellular 
and Wi-Fi services.  By exploiting the buffer overflow vulnerability in these dual-mode 
terminals, an attacker can execute arbitrary code which will enable them to use the 
terminals as gateways into the cellular network.  Also, these dual-mode phones open the 
cellular network up to the vulnerabilities associated with using Wi-Fi services [96].   
 Since wireless communications are passed through the air, anyone within range is 
capable of eavesdropping on or intercepting these communications.  All an attacker needs 
to eavesdrop wireless communications is a “packet sniffing” program, many of which are 
available for free.  “Packet sniffing” programs display all data they find being transmitted 
in the public WiFi local area network (LAN) [126].  In addition, Wi-Fi networks and 
users continue to use the highly vulnerable wireless encryption protocol (WEP) to protect 
these communications.   WEP headers are not encrypted, so source and destinations 
addresses of every packet sent are easily identifiable.  Also, since the WEP encryption 
key never changes unless manually changed by the network administrator, an 
eavesdropping attacker could monitor communications over a period of time and gather 
information to enable them to determine the encryption key via statistical analysis and 
decrypt the data [111].  Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA) replaced WEP and provides 
better protection for wireless communications.  However, WPA is still not completely 
secure.  WPA uses mathematical algorithms in order to provide authentication of users to 
the network.  The use of these mathematical algorithms makes WPA vulnerable to attack.  
If a legitimate user (or an attacker) sends two unauthorized data packets within one 
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second, WPA thinks it is being attacked and shuts down.  An attacker can take advantage 
of this aspect of WPA by sending unauthorized data packets periodically.  This would 
cause periodic shutdowns of WPA [68].    
Wi-Fi networks are also vulnerable to man-in-the-middle attacks.  If an attacker 
can masquerade as a legitimate Wi-Fi network, once legitimate users are connected to the 
attacker’s network, the attacker can view, modify, and replay data, inject data, and 
impersonate legitimate users all without the users’ knowledge.  If the attacker sends the 
users’ data on to the legitimate wireless network after it passes through the attacker’s 
network, the legitimate user will not notice any change in services [52].  Wi-Fi networks 
are susceptible to malicious software, such as viruses, worms, and Trojan horses, as are 
all networks connecting to the Internet.  They are also subject to DoS attacks which can 
be implemented on Wi-Fi networks to overwhelm legitimate network signals by 
introducing a strong interfering signal or by flooding a NAP by exploiting the IEEE 
802.11 medium arbitration algorithm which is supposed to prevent users from trying to 
send signals at the same time [125].  The attacker would need a powerful transmitter and 
would need to be located somewhere nearby to introduce a sufficiently strong interfering 
signal into the network to cause DoS.  This would make locating the attacker relatively 
easy.  In the case of the network flooding attack, the attacker will use up available 
bandwidth and cause DoS to legitimate users.  In addition, Wi-Fi networks are 
susceptible to ARP spoofing as discussed previously in Section 4.3.4 as well as hijacking, 
phishing, and man-in-the-middle attacks as discussed in Section 4.2.4, Section 4.3.6, and 
Section 4.4.1, respectively.   
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4.4.2 Satellite Service Provider (SSP) Connection Vulnerabilities 
SSPs offer satellite services to remote users via the network of ground- and space-
based infrastructure.  Users connect to SSPs via the Internet.  Therefore, SSPs are 
susceptible to the vulnerabilities of Internet connections as discussed in Section 4.3.6.  
Also, SSPs operate the hub Earth stations for VSAT networks.  Therefore, SSPs are 
subject to the vulnerabilities discussed in Section 4.3.2 relating to VSAT central hubs.  
Since SSPs provide satellite services to users, SSPs are susceptible to all the 
vulnerabilities associated with these services, as well.  The services offered are specific to 
the satellite under consideration.  In this case, the example of INTELSAT 14 and the 
IRIS payload will be continued and the vulnerabilities of the services to be offered by this 
satellite’s payloads will be analyzed.   
The IRIS payload is intended to be capable of providing ad hoc networking; voice 
over IP (VoIP) services; virtual private network (VPN) services; video teleconferencing 
services; bandwidth on demand; voice, video, and data transmission services;  and cross-
beam, cross-band, and multicast information services without the use of an Earth station 
relay.  Therefore, the IRIS payload (and INTELSAT 14 satellite) may be susceptible to 
the vulnerabilities associated with each of these services.   
Ad hoc networking is vulnerable to a multitude of routing attacks, such as 
spoofing routing information, altering routing information, replaying routing information, 
selective forwarding, and sinkhole attacks.  These attacks can be performed by dropping, 
changing, or injecting packets into the network.  Spoofed, altered, and replayed routing 
information can cause such effects as generating false error messages, dividing the 
network, and increasing end-to-end transmission time.  Selective forwarding indicates 
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that some messages are always dropped, degrading network services.  Sinkhole attacks 
force traffic to go through the attacker, enabling the occurrence of other types of attacks 
[63]. 
VoIP phone default settings generally do not include traffic encryption.  If VoIP 
data is not encrypted, it is relatively easy for an attacker to intercept data, eavesdrop VoIP 
calls, and record VoIP calls [12].  VoIP phones are vulnerable to buffer overflow attacks 
that would cause the phone to crash.  An attacker can use the Session Initiation Protocol 
(SIP) to take advantage of the buffer overflow attack enabling the attacker to connect to 
the victim’s terminal and view, copy, delete, modify, or steal user files.  SIP is a signaling 
protocol used to set up and terminate multimedia communications, such as VoIP calls 
[78].  Many VoIP phones are susceptible to DoS and DDoS attacks, spam, viruses, ARP 
spoofing attacks, packet injection, and VoIP data interception [12, 91, 142].  In addition, 
VoIP is vulnerable to call hijacking, malicious call termination, and information spoofing 
[142].  Also, since VoIP phones have web-based user interfaces, they are susceptible to 
man-in-the-middle attacks.  These man-in-the-middle attacks require knowing the victim 
terminal’s IP address.  In order to obtain this information, the attacker can try guessing, 
using an XSS Intranet scanning attack (as discussed in Section 4.3.7), or by doing an 
Nmap scan.  An Nmap scan is used to make a map of the network by scanning for 
terminals and services on the network.  Once the IP address is discovered, the attacker 
can steal data, gain control over the victim’s VoIP phone, disable the victim’s VoIP 
phone, monitor the victim’s use of the VoIP phone, or even eavesdrop the conversations 
going on in the victim’s surroundings [72].   
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The applications of these VoIP services over INTELSAT satellites include:  
interoffice trunking over the Internet or corporate Intranets, business continuity and 
disaster recovery, pre-paid calling card services, VoIP peering, Internet cafés, and IP 
Central Office Exchange (Centrex) [88].  Some of these applications have additional 
vulnerabilities associated with them on top of the VoIP vulnerabilities discussed above.  
VoIP peering, or call forwarding between Internet telephony service providers (ITSPs), 
decentralizes the call routing which normally involves the use of a central hub.  This 
decentralization of the routing makes it easier for an attacker to take over a legitimate 
user’s number [137].  This application typically uses the session initiation protocol (SIP) 
signaling protocol.  This protocol has several vulnerabilities associated with it that may 
affect the VoIP peering application [99].  For instance, SIP vulnerabilities could allow an 
attacker to access a user terminal and cause it to become unstable, cause a DoS attack, or 
cause VoIP services to be interrupted [34].  There is a particular vulnerability in SIP 
forking proxies that can enable an “exponentially-growing message exchange attack” 
which would result in the network being flooded with traffic.  SIP forking proxies are 
servers that are used to search for correspondents [30].  SIP is also subject to spoofing 
attacks.  An attacker could send INITIATE requests (to begin a communication session) 
with false IP addresses to spoof a legitimate user or send spoofed BYE requests to cause 
call termination [140].  In addition, SIP may be vulnerable to eavesdropping, man-in-the-
middle attacks, attacks forcing a VoIP phone to reboot, call redirection, and registration 
manipulation (erasure or hijacking of a legitimate user’s registration attempt, or addition 
of false registrations).   In the case of man-in-the-middle attacks, an attacker would inject 
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their rogue terminals into the network between proxies [42].  IP Centrex is a business-
grade phone service.  It is also susceptible to the aforementioned SIP vulnerabilities [43].   
VPN’s are subject to the SSH vulnerabilities previously discussed in Section 4.3.3.  
In addition, VPN’s are vulnerable to viruses, man-in-the-middle attacks, hijacking, and 
VPN spoofing.  Viruses may be passed onto the VPN via a user Internet connection if the 
user is connected to both simultaneously.  VPN man-in-the-middle attacks can allow an 
attacker to intercept, replay, redirect, delete, modify, or insert data as well as reflecting 
data back to the sender.  VPN hijacking involves an attacker taking over a legitimate 
user’s already-initiated VPN connection and masquerading as the legitimate user to the 
network [82].  VPN spoofing, if successful, can allow an attacker unauthorized access to 
a VPN.  The attack is implemented by first creating packets with false IP addresses.  
These packets are sent to legitimate users and to make the user think the attacker’s device 
is legitimate.  The attacker then may be able to alter routing information and obtain 
access to authentication sequences.  This information may yield unauthorized access to 
the VPN for the attacker [36].  IP VPNs are intended to enable a company’s customers 
and partners to securely connect to the company’s Intranet and connect the company with 
an IP wide area network that can carry voice, video, and data over a single connection 
[71].  IP VPNs run over TCP/IP (See Figure 22.). 
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Figure 22.  IP-VPN over TCP/IP Illustration [85] 
   
 
TCP/IP is vulnerable to packet sniffing, IP spoofing, and TCP session hijacking, 
to name a few.  IP spoofing refers to a process in which an attacker creates false packets 
with a legitimate user’s IP address, impersonating packets sent by the legitimate user.  IP 
spoofing can be used cause DoS or to gain unauthorized access to a network [55].  If an 
attacker sends a SYN packet with a spoofed IP address to a host in order to request a 
connection with the host, then the host will reply to the attacker’s spoofed IP address with 
a SYN/ACK packet.  The SYN packet is the first packet in a connection indicating that 
the attacker wants to create a connection with the host server.  The SYN/ACK packet 
acknowledges the hosts receipt of the attacker’s SYN packet and sends the host’s SYN 
information in return.  The attacker then never sends an ACK packet to the host to 
acknowledge receipt of the SYN/ACK packet, so the connection request remains on the 
stack.  The attacker then continues to send SYN packets with the spoofed IP address, 
thereby leaving many unanswered connection requests on the stack, using up system 
resources and causing DoS.  This type of attack is called SYN flooding.  Also, TCP/IP is 
subject to packet spoofing.  An attacker could inject a packet into the network and then 
give it a false source IP address.  By specifying the route the packet takes through the 
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network instead of letting it go through the network routers, the attacker’s packet can be 
sent with a spoofed IP address.  TCP session hijacking involves the attacker taking over 
an already-initiated connection and masquerading as a legitimate user.  This can be done 
via a man-in-the-middle attack, for example [141].  The Internet Control Message 
Protocol (ICMP) is used in the TCP/IP IP layer to send one-way messages to a host.  
ICMP can be used in DoS attacks or allow attackers to intercept packets.  An attacker can 
send a false “time exceeded” or “destination unreachable” message to a victim causing 
the victim to end their connection.  The ICMP “redirect” message can be used to intercept 
packets.  If an attacker sends a false ICMP “redirect” message to a victim, the victim will 
then end up sending certain connection packets through the attacker’s device [95].   
 One of the applications of INTELSAT’s bandwidth on demand services is 
maritime communications [89].  Maritime communications depend on the Global 
Positioning System (GPS) for timing synchronization.  GPS timing is vulnerable to bad 
weather and may be lost during severe storms [97].  Also, GPS timing, since it is 
provided by the GPS satellites, is susceptible to all of the vulnerabilities associated with 
satellites discussed previously in Section 4.2, such as jamming or intentional physical 
attack.   
 The implications of the IRIS payload multicasting information to users are that 
user terminals will be subject to the vulnerabilities associated with multicasting.  The 
nature of multicasting is that anyone can join a multicast group, and when packets are 
sent to the multicast group address, all members receive those packets.  The 
vulnerabilities of multicasting include:  DoS attacks, flooding attacks, forged data attacks, 
sending of false acknowledgements (ACKs), Scalable Reliable Multicast Protocol 
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(SRMP) vulnerabilities, buffer overflows, rushing attacks, neighbor attacks, black hole 
attacks, and jellyfish attacks [100, 105, 117].  Flooding attacks involve the attacker 
sending many data packets to the multicast group, using up network resources and 
degrading services.  Since the Reliable Multicast Protocol (RMP) does not verify that a 
packet’s network address matches the multicast group identifier, the attacker can send 
forged data to the multicast group.  An attacker can modify the order of data packets by 
sending false ACKs to the multicast group.  The SRMP can be manipulated by an 
attacker to generate negative ACKs (NAKs).  These NAKs can be created by changing 
the TTL in the packet header.  These NAKs are only received by some of the multicast 
group members.  If the group members receiving the attacker’s NAKs try to send their 
own NAKs, the group members’ NAKs will be blocked, and therefore a retransmission of 
the data packets that were not received will not be initiated.  In addition, an attacker can 
cancel any retransmissions from legitimate multicast group members by creating their 
own retransmissions with a shortened TTL [100].  Rushing attacks involve an attacker 
entering routing paths between legitimate users.  As an intermediate node, the attacker’s 
device only processes the first non-duplicated data packet and avoids processing any 
duplicate packets sent later.  When a legitimate user sends route discovery packets into 
the network in order to determine the best route to the desired destination for their 
packets, the attacker’s device can quickly forward these route discovery packets.  The 
attacker’s device then gains priority when routing paths are being selected by legitimate 
users, increasing the chances of a user’s packets passing through the attacker’s device on 
their way to their final destination.  If instead of forwarding the route discovery packets, 
the attacker replays them without updating their routing information, this is termed a 
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neighbor attack.  When the attacker replays the route discovery packets, it can cause two 
users that are not within range of each other to think that they are neighbors.  These two 
users then will try to directly send packets to each other, resulting in the packets being 
lost.  If instead of forwarding the route discovery packets as in the rushing attack case the 
attacker drops some (or all) of the data packets, this is termed a black hole attack.  This 
type of attack degrades network performance by reducing packet delivery.  A jellyfish 
attack involves the attacker beginning with a rushing attack, but instead of forwarding the 
route discovery packets the attacker delays them and then forwards them.  Jellyfish 
attacks diminish the ability to provide real-time communications by increasing the end-
to-end communications delay [117].   
 
4.4.3 Point-of-Presence (PoP) Connection Vulnerabilities 
Since PoPs enable remote users to access the Internet, Intranets, and cellular 
networks, PoPs subject users to the vulnerabilities associated with Internet, Intranet, and 
cellular network access.  All of these vulnerabilities were discussed in previous sections 
and will not be repeated in this section.  PoPs use routers to provide access points through 
which user terminals can connect, and these PoP routers can support any of the data link 
layer protocols mentioned in Section 3.5.2 in order to provide this access to users.  These 
PoP routers and the data link layer protocols they support increase the number of 
vulnerabilities that a user terminal becomes susceptible to when connecting to satellite 
services via a PoP.   
HDLC and LAPB are both based on the American National Standards Institute 
(ANSI) standard Advanced Data Communication Control Procedures (ADCCP) data link 
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layer protocol.  HDLC, ADCCP, and PPP can all be used to make point-to-point 
connections, while the Ethernet data link layer protocol is generally used for local area 
networks [5].  HDLC and ADCCP were both precursors to the Ethernet protocol.  PPP, or 
point-to-point tunneling protocol (PPTP) as it is also known, relies on a single user name 
and password for authentication.  This user name and password can be easily obtained by 
an attacker by monitoring user data packets.  The PPP encryption key can also be broken 
relatively easily.  It is only a 128-bit key and the same key is used at each end of the 
transmission [29].  Once the attacker has obtained the user name, password, and 
encryption key, they have access to sensitive user data and can even launch a DoS attack 
against the PPP server.  The vulnerabilities associated with PPP are not due to flaws in 
the protocol itself, but are due to flaws in Microsoft’s implementation of the protocol 
[136].  The Ethernet protocol utilizes a carrier-sense-multiple access/collision detection 
(CSMA/CD) scheme.  The CSMA/CD scheme works by instructing users that want to 
transmit data that they must wait until other users have finished transmitting.  The data 
that is transmitted can be seen by all other users on the network, creating a vulnerability 
to packet sniffing.  The Ethernet protocol is also subject to data collisions.  If two users 
decide to transmit data at the exact same time, the data will collide.  The users then must 
wait and retransmit their data at a later time, increasing the end-to-end transmission delay 
[61].  If instead an attacker continues to send packets and does not wait until the line is 
clear to retransmit, the attacker can cause DoS.  Since the Ethernet protocol does not have 
built-in authentication, it is also vulnerable to packet spoofing and ARP spoofing (as 
discussed in Section 4.3.4) [116].   
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PoP routers may be susceptible to such attacks as:  IP address spoofing, 
unauthorized access, DoS attacks, and buffer overflow attacks.  PoP routers may use the 
simple network management protocol (SNMP) to support router access control [131].  
SNMP is an application layer protocol that is used in the exchanging of management 
information between network devices.  Cisco Systems, one of the companies 
collaborating on the IRIS project, supports SNMP in its router software [39].  SNMP 
vulnerabilities may allow unauthorized access to the PoP router, DoS attacks, buffer 
overflow attacks, may cause service interruptions, or may cause the router to become 
unstable.  SNMP trap messages are sent from user terminals to the network management 
system (NMS) and are meant to update the NMS on the state of the user terminal.  SNMP 
trap messages may notify the NMS of warnings or errors on the user terminal.  The NMS 
must decode and process the SNMP trap messages from the user terminals.  It is this 
decoding and processing of SNMP trap messages that makes the SNMP vulnerable to 
DoS and buffer overflows.  The NMS also sends requests for information to the user 
terminals or sends messages to user terminals indicating they need to change their 
configuration settings.  These messages must be decoded and processed by the user 
terminals.  The decoding and processing of these SNMP request messages again makes 
SNMP vulnerable to DoS and buffer overflows [33].  SNMP uses community strings (i.e. 
the community names) to provide some level of authentication for NMS requests.  
However, these community strings are in clear text in SNMP messages making them 
easily accessible to attackers.  If an attacker can access an SNMP community string, the 
attacker can gain access to the SNMP Management Information Base (MIB).  This 
SNMP community string vulnerability may result in DoS or the information gained by 
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the attacker through accessing the MIB may allow them to launch further attacks against 
the network [149].  In terms of routing protocols, the PoP router may use the BGP or any 
of the other routing protocols discussed in Section 4.3.8.   
 
4.4.4 Standard PC Device Connection Vulnerabilities 
Remote users can also access satellite services via standard PC devices, as 
discussed in Section 3.5.3.  The PCMCIA interface ports used to connect the user 
terminals to standard PC devices may be susceptible to attack, as well as the PC devices 
themselves.  Wireless local area network (WLAN) Cardbus devices can be installed in 
the PCMCIA ports, enabling a wireless connection from user terminal to PC device.  
These WLAN Cardbus adapters use either WEP or WPA encryption [1].  The 
vulnerabilities associated with WEP and WPA were discussed in Section 4.4.1.  Also, 
since PC devices are generally also connected to the Internet, the vulnerabilities 
associated with Internet connectivity discussed in Section 4.3.6 apply to these standard 
PC device-to-user terminal connections.   
 
4.4.5 User Segment Vulnerabilities Summary 
SSPs and PoPs are the most vulnerable components of the user segment.  SSPs 
not only incorporate all of the vulnerabilities of the satellite services offered by the 
particular satellite in question, but they also suffer the vulnerabilities of Internet 
connectivity.  In addition, since SSPs operate the VSAT central hub, the vulnerabilities 
associated with the hubs are included in the SSP vulnerabilities.  PoPs, on the other hand, 
are susceptible to the vulnerabilities of the PoP routers, the PoP router protocols, Internet 
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access, Intranet access, and cellular network access.  The offerings provided by each of 
these components of the user segment make them vulnerable to a multitude of different 
attacks.   
 
4.5 Attacking INTELSAT 14 and the IRIS Payload 
 
 
The IRIS space system, which is intended to offer IP routing via satellite, will 
consist of the IRIS satellite (i.e. INTELSAT 14), IRIS payload operator facilities, and the 
IRIS users.  The IRIS satellite and payload operator facilities will manage the services 
being offered by the IRIS payload and will provide Internet connectivity.  Figure 23 
illustrates the planned configuration for the IRIS space system.   
 
 
Figure 23.  Illustration of Planned IRIS Space System Configuration [106] 
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Note that the Joint, Inter-Agency, Inter-Governmental, and Multi-National (JIIM) NOC 
shown in Figure 23, which will manage IRIS services for JIIM missions, may only be 
present in a “virtual sense”.   The JIIM users include U.S. Department of Defense air, 
maritime, and land forces [106].   
The design aspects of the IRIS satellite that make it different from a traditional, 
bent-pipe COMSAT are its on-board processing capabilities and the IP router that it will 
carry.  The IP router will enable the satellite to receive packets directly from user 
terminals without the use of an Earth station.  Since the IRIS IP router is the new 
technology being tested on-board this satellite, it is necessary to examine the possibilities 
for attacking this new technology in order that it can be protected.  Therefore, the 
remainder of this document will focus on attacking the IRIS IP router.  In order to 
accomplish this feat, an attacker would need to attack the satellite uplink (the 
communications link from the Earth to the satellite).  If the case of an attack on the 
satellite downlink were examined, the signal would have already gone through the 
routing process on-board the satellite, and therefore that case will not be discussed here.   
According to Figure 23, an attacker would have a few possible options for gaining 
access to the satellite uplink.  Suppose that the JIIM user is in the midst of a conflict and 
is under attack.  If the JIIM user is overtaken or captured, then the attackers will likely be 
able to gain access to the JIIM user terminal.  With access to the JIIM user terminal, the 
attackers can pose as a legitimate JIIM user and send signals to the IRIS satellite.  
Accessing the JIIM user terminal may require a user name and password.  Since the JIIM 
users are connected to the Internet via the IRIS spacecraft, packet sniffers may have 
revealed the JIIM user’s user name and password prior to the attack making takeover of 
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the JIIM user terminal relatively easy.   Suppose instead, that the attackers are able to 
gain access to the payload operator NOC.  Since INTELSAT 14 is a commercial satellite, 
the payload operator NOC will likely be a commercial facility, and therefore will not 
secured with strong physical security measures.  It would likely be relatively easy for an 
attacker to gain access to the commercial payload operator NOC.  If hackers can gain 
access to Johnson Space Center (JSC) as they allegedly did in April 2008 and cause 
disruptions on-board the ISS (see Section 4.2.4 for a discussion of this event), then the 
IRIS payload operator NOC could be at risk.  The JSC hackers used a Trojan horse to 
gain access to the satellite uplink after they had gained entry to the facility.  Attackers of 
the IRIS payload operator NOC could take a similar approach to gain access to the uplink 
to the IRIS satellite.   An attacker may be able to gain access to the satellite uplink 
remotely via the Internet connection provided by the IRIS satellite and the payload 
operator NOC.  An attacker may be able to install a backdoor onto the JIIM user terminal 
by using a virus that is passed to the terminal via the Internet, as discussed previously in 
Section 4.3.6.  Once the backdoor is in place, the attacker may then be able to take 
control over the user terminal, thereby gaining access to the satellite uplink.  Again in this 
case, a packet sniffer (or phishing attack) used previous to the backdoor attack may be 
necessary to gain knowledge of the JIIM user’s user name and password.   
Once the attacker has gained access to the satellite uplink, they can send 
malicious signals to the satellite that will be passed to the IRIS IP router by way of the 
satellite antenna.  In the cases where the attackers actually took over the JIIM user 
terminal, a session hijacking attack (discussed in Section 4.2.4) may be possible.  The 
attackers can masquerade as the legitimate JIIM user and possibly intercept sensitive 
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communications from other JIIM users.  If the attackers instead just send a multitude of 
packets to the IRIS IP router, they may cause a buffer overflow.  As discussed in Section 
4.3.8, this type of attack could cause the router’s output buffer to become full, resulting in 
queuing delays, packet loss, and interruption of services.  If other JIIM users’ packets are 
lost, they may try to retransmit their data, which would only result in further queuing 
delays and packet loss.  In addition, the routing protocol to be used on the IRIS IP router 
will likely be vulnerable to insertion of false routing information.  Routing protocols are 
not generally designed to protect against the insertion and propagation of false routing 
information.  The injection and propagation of false routing information in the JIIM user 
network could be disastrous especially where real-time communications are needed.  
However, the IRIS IP router routing protocol is unknown at this time, and so further 
analysis of its exploitation is not possible.  In terms of protocols that support router 
access control, the IRIS IP router may use SNMP.  As discussed in Section 4.4.3, Cisco 
Systems uses SNMP in its router software, and Cisco happens to be the company 
providing the IP networking software for the IRIS IP router.  An attacker with access to 
the satellite uplink could send SNMP trap messages to the IRIS IP router, which would 
likely result in DoS and buffer overflows.   
A knowledgeable attacker, upon gaining access to the satellite uplink, could 
wreak havoc on the IRIS satellite network, causing anywhere from denial of services to 
interception of sensitive data.  Therefore, it is necessary to protect the IRIS space system 
components that could allow the attacker to access the satellite uplink.  Strong physical 
security at the payload operator NOC will be required, as well as protection for user 
terminals.  User terminal protection needs to include strong anti-virus software that can 
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eliminate the possibility of an attacker installing a backdoor onto a user terminal via a 
virus.   
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V: Conclusions and Suggestions for Future Work 
 
 
The purpose of this research was to provide an understanding of potential 
vulnerabilities in satellite communications systems by first identifying various attacker 
entry points into a typical system and then determining the specific vulnerabilities at each 
identified access point.  An attack scenario on the IRIS payload was presented as an 
example in order to provide an understanding of the possible impact of attacks on U.S. 
satellite communications systems.  This thesis attempts to provide a basis for finding 
ways to avoid future attacks on U.S. space assets by supplying information on the ways 
satellite communications systems can be attacked.   
 Since satellite communications have become increasingly important in both the 
U.S. and in countries across the globe, the protection of space assets will become vital in 
order to keep these communications from being disrupted.  Satellite communications 
have become an important component of the U.S.’s net-centric warfare doctrine.  
Therefore, an attack on U.S. space systems could have serious impacts on U.S. war 
fighting capabilities.  Given that the U.S. relies on commercial COMSAT capacity to 
help meet military bandwidth needs, commercial space systems, as well as military-
dedicated space systems, are vulnerable to attacks from U.S. adversaries.   While military 
satellites employ some protection techniques, commercial COMSATs are predominantly 
unprotected against attacks such as RF jamming.  An understanding of the vulnerabilities 
of these systems is required in order to know how to protect these space systems from 
future attacks.   
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 This research determined that the most vulnerable component of the satellite 
communications system’s space segment is the satellite antenna.  The satellite antenna is 
vulnerable to intentional attacks including:  RF jamming, spoofing, meaconing, and 
deliberate physical attack.  RF jamming can cause signal degradation or even total signal 
loss.  Spoofing is generally only a problem for COMSATs with on-board processing 
capabilities.  This type of attack can allow the attacker to take control of the satellite 
receiver.  Meaconing can result in transmission delays.  Deliberate physical attack of the 
satellite can, of course, result in total loss of communications and likely total loss of the 
satellite.    
 The most vulnerable Earth segment component was found to be the Earth station 
network.  It is vulnerable to both Earth station and NOC vulnerabilities, to include:  RF 
jamming, deliberate physical attack, and Internet connection vulnerabilities.  Internet 
connectivity is susceptible to spyware, phishing attacks, viruses, backdoors, Trojan 
horses, worms, session hijacking, and user impersonation, to name a few.  In addition, if 
an attacker can gain control of the TT&C link, the result may be loss of satellite control.  
Also, access router flaws and router protocol vulnerabilities could enable an attacker to 
stop traffic from entering or leaving the NOC or enable an attacker to gain access to the 
Earth station network, both of which could cause service interruptions to occur. 
 This research found that the most vulnerable user segment components are the 
SSPs and PoPs.  SSPs are subject to the vulnerabilities of the services offered, the 
vulnerabilities of Internet connectivity (as mentioned in the previous paragraph), and the 
vulnerabilities associated with operating the VSAT central hub.  VSAT networks 
vulnerable to attackers inserting rogue devices into the network which could allow the 
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attackers to eavesdrop data being sent to legitimate users.  In a star topology VSAT 
network, if the central hub is compromised, the entire network is likely at risk, because 
all neighboring VSATs are connected to one hub.  The vulnerabilities of services were 
discussed in terms of the IRIS payload, which is intended to offer such services as:  ad 
hoc networking, VoIP, VPN, and multicasting.  Ad hoc networking is susceptible to 
routing attacks which could divide the network and increase end-to-end transmission 
times.  VoIP is vulnerable to data interception, eavesdropping, call recording, phones 
being caused to crash, and all of the vulnerabilities associated with Internet connectivity.  
VPNs are subject to SSH protocol vulnerabilities, as well as viruses, hijacking, spoofing, 
and man-in-the-middle attacks.  VPN vulnerabilities could allow an attacker to gain 
access to the VPN, cause DoS, and intercept data.  Multicasting is vulnerable to several 
attacks, including:  flooding, black hole, and jellyfish.  Flooding attacks and black hole 
attacks both can cause degradations of network services.  Jellyfish attacks increase end-
to-end transmission times.   
 PoPs are subject to Internet (and Intranet) access vulnerabilities, as discussed 
previously.  Also, PoPs are open to additional vulnerabilities from providing cellular 
network access, such as eavesdropping and DoS.  PoP routers are vulnerable to attackers 
gaining unauthorized access, service interruptions, and router instabilities caused by 
SNMP exploitation.  In regards to routing protocols, PPP and the Ethernet protocol, for 
example, are subject to attackers gaining access to sensitive user data and DoS attacks.   
 The example presented of the attack on the IRIS payload, showed that the IRIS 
spacecraft may be susceptible to session hijacking, buffer overflow attacks, and 
exploitation of SNMP vulnerabilities all due to the IP router on-board.  Session hijacking 
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could allow interception of sensitive communications, while buffer overflow attacks and 
exploitation of SNMP vulnerabilities could result in service interruption or complete 
denial of services.  All of these attacks can occur only after the attackers gain access to 
the satellite uplink.   
 There remain many possibilities for future work on the topic of satellite 
communications system vulnerabilities, and in particular the IRIS system.  For example, 
once the IRIS IP routing protocol becomes known, further vulnerability analysis may 
reveal additional vulnerabilities that an attacker could exploit.  Also, it would be 
beneficial to model and simulate the results for one of the possible IRIS system attacks in 
order to verify that it is indeed possible and provide some insight on ways to protect 
against this type of attack.     
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